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NOTES
IT'S THE PROSECUTION'S STORY, BUT THEY'RE
NOT STICKING TO IT: APPLYING HARMLESS
ERROR AND JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL TO
EXCULPATORY POST-CONVICTION DNA
TESTING CASES
Hilary S. Ritter*
INTRODUCTION

Roy Criner was convicted in 1990 for the 1986 sexual assault and murder
of a sixteen-year-old girl in Montgomery, Texas.1 His conviction rested
largely on the basis of incriminating statements Criner made to friends and
coworkers on the night the crime occurred. 2 The State also used the results
of serology testing performed on the semen collected from the victim's
vaginal and rectal specimens,3 which indicated that the source of the semen
was a man with type 0 blood, to link Criner, who has type 0 blood, to the
crime. 4 Other physical evidence from the crime scene included a cigarette
found near the victim's body, a clump of blonde hair found clutched in the
victim's right hand, and the victim's clothing. 5
Post-conviction DNA testing performed in 1997 demonstrated that Criner
was not the source of the semen collected from the victim's vaginal and
7
rectal specimens. 6 Regardless, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
J.D. Candidate, 2006, Fordham University School of Law.
1. See
The
Innocence
Project,
Case
Profiles:
Roy
Criner,
http://innocenceproject.org/case/display_profile.php?id=77 (last visited Sept. 28, 2005)
[hereinafter Case Profiles] ; see also Frontline: The Case for Innocence: Four Cases,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/case/cases/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2005)
[hereinafter Four Cases].
2. Criner bragged to friends that he picked up and had sex with a young woman and
"had to get rough with her." Case Profiles, supra note 1.
3. Id
4. See id.; Frontline: The Casefor Innocence: Interviews: Judge SharonKeller (PBS
television
broadcast
Oct.
31,
2000)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/case/interviews/keller.html)
[hereinafter
Keller Interview].
5. Case Profiles, supra note 1.
6. 1d; Four Cases, supra note 1.
7. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is the highest state court for appeals of
criminal cases.
Texas Online, Government:
Courts and Judiciary System,
*
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denied Criner's motion for a new trial on the basis of the exculpatory DNA
test results. 8 In denying Criner's motion, the court accepted the State's two
new theories of the crime, theories which were never presented to the jury
at trial. 9 First, the State contended that the DNA test results were
insufficient evidence of Criner's innocence, because Criner could have been
wearing a condom during the assault or have failed to ejaculate, two
scenarios that had never been presented to the jury at Criner's trial. 10 In the
alternative, the State argued that the presence of semen that was not
Criner's could have been due to the victim engaging in consensual sex prior
to her murder, which the State argued was likely since the victim was
known to have been "promiscuous."'11 This theory was also contrary to the
theory that the State presented at Criner's trial, where the State contended
that the sixteen-year-old victim had not had sex with anyone else, and that it
12
was Criner's semen that was found in the victim.
Criner then obtained post-conviction DNA testing on the cigarette found
next to the victim's body. 13 The DNA recovered from the cells on the
cigarette filter contained a mixture of DNA from at least three individuals,
at least one of which was a male and at least one of which was a female. 14
The female portion of the DNA found on the cigarette was genetically
compatible with the DNA profile of the victim, and Criner was eliminated
as a source of any of the DNA on the cigarette filter. 15 Moreover, the male
DNA found on the cigarette matched the DNA profile of the semen found
on the victim's rectal swab.' 6 Thus, the male who smoked the cigarette was
also the male whose semen was found in the victim-and this person was
not Roy Criner. 17 The results of this round of DNA testing also disproved
the alternate theories of the evidence advanced by the State to explain how
Criner was guilty despite the exculpatory results of the first round of DNA
testing. 18 On the basis of this evidence, the State pardoned Criner in 2000,
three years after the first round of DNA tests excluded him as the source of

http://www.state.tx.us/category.jsp?language=eng&categoryld=6.3
2005).

(last

visited

Oct. 5,

8. See Four Cases,supra note 1.
9. See Frontline: The Case for Innocence: Interviews: Judge Charles Baird (PBS
television
broadcast
Oct.
31,
2000)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/case/interviews/baird.html)
[hereinafter
BairdInterview].
10. Id.; see also Case Profiles, supra note 1.
11. See Keller Interview, supra note 4.
12. BairdInterview, supra note 9.
13. Case Profiles, supra note 1.
14. Id.
15. Id.

16. Id.
17. Four Cases, supra note 1.
18. See id
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the semen found in the victim's body. 19 By the time he was released,
20
Criner had served ten years of a ninety-nine year sentence.
Unfortunately, Roy Criner's plight is not unique. While nearly half of
the 16321 convicted offenders nationwide who have been exonerated
through DNA testing obtained access to DNA evidence with the consent of
prosecutors, the other half had to engage in protracted litigation to obtain
access to, and to prove the probative value of, the exculpatory evidence that
eventually set them free. 22 Thus, although post-conviction DNA testing
statutes 23 provide a mechanism whereby convicted offenders can obtain
DNA testing in support of their post-conviction claims of innocence, the
efficiency, ease, and likelihood of success in obtaining relief through the
requested testing is often directly dependent on how prosecutors respond to
24
such requests.
This Note examines the two ways in which courts can prevent
prosecutors from creating a new theory of the crime when the results of
post-conviction DNA testing undermine the theory upon which a defendant
was convicted: (1) the adoption of the harmless error test as the standard of
review for these cases, and (2) the application of judicial estoppel against
the State. 25 Part I describes the forensic application of DNA testing and the
three ways in which the results of DNA testing are used in the criminal
justice system. Part I also introduces the newly discovered evidence test,
which is the standard courts currently use to evaluate claims of innocence
based on the results of post-conviction DNA testing, and the harmless error
test, which is the standard courts traditionally use to evaluate the impact of
19. See Case Profiles, supra note 1; Fourcases, supra note 1.
20. Four Cases, supra note 1; see also Case Profiles, supra note 1.

21. This is the number exonerated as of October 11, 2005. See The Innocence Project,
http://innocenceproject.org (last visited Oct. 11, 2005).
22. See
The
Innocence
Project,
Causes
&
Remedies:
DNA,
http://innocenceproject.org/causes/dna.php (last visited Sept. 28, 2005).
23. To date, thirty-one states have enacted statutes that provide for post-conviction DNA
testing, and additional states have made post-conviction testing available through other
procedures. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Advancing Justice Through DNA Technology: Using
DNA
to
Protect
the
Innocent
(2003),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/dnapolicybook_protectinnocent.htm
[hereinafter
Advancing
Justice].
24. See Judith A. Goldberg & David M. Siegel, The Ethical Obligations of Prosecutors
in Cases Involving Postconviction Claims ofInnocence, 38 Cal. W. L. Rev. 389, 393 (2002).

25. In addition, prosecutors sometimes oppose--often vigorously-requests for postconviction DNA testing, arguments which are beyond the scope of this Note. For a review
of the ethical and constitutional implications of such arguments, see id See also Seth F.
Kreimer & David Rudovsky, Double Helix, Double Bind: Factual Innocence and
Postconviction DNA Testing, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 547 (2002); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring
the Ethics of ProsecutorialTrial Practice: Can ProsecutorsDo Justice?, 44 Vand. L. Rev.
45, 61 (1991) (stating that "[i]f the evidence is in conflict, an ethical prosecutor cannot
rationalize a conviction simply on the ground that the trial [was] fair"). Furthermore, it is
questionable whether the ethical obligations of prosecutors are adequate to protect
defendants from the harms of prosecutorial inconsistency. For an argument that they are not,
see Anne Bowen Poulin, ProsecutorialInconsistency, Estoppel, and Due Process: Making

the Prosecution Get Its Story Straight, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1423, 1431-33 (2001).
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technical errors that occurred at trial. This part also presents the doctrine of
judicial estoppel and the application of the doctrine in both the civil and
criminal contexts. Part II of this Note examines two ways in which defense
attorneys have recently tried to prevent prosecutors from asserting a
position contrary to that which they advanced at trial in reaction to postconviction DNA test results which demonstrate the convicted offender is
not the source of critical biological evidence that the State linked to the
offender at trial. First, the doctrine under which post-conviction claims of
innocence are traditionally analyzed, the newly discovered evidence test, is
examined and compared with a proposed test, the harmless error test. Part
II next summarizes the different approaches that courts have taken, or have
declined to take, in applying judicial estoppel against the State in criminal
cases. Finally, Part III of this Note argues that courts should adopt the
harmless error test in analyzing post-conviction claims of innocence based
on exculpatory DNA test results. In addition, courts should invoke judicial
estoppel against the State to bar prosecutors from making arguments in
post-conviction proceedings that are inconsistent with the theory of the
crime asserted at trial when convicted offenders offer exculpatory DNA test
results as evidence of actual innocence.
I. DNA TESTING AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
This part will examine three ways in which DNA test results are
routinely used in the criminal justice system: to convict the guilty, to
exclude suspects, and to identify those who have been wrongly convicted.
This part also will introduce the two standards courts use in reviewing
challenges to convictions: the newly discovered evidence test and the
harmless error test. Finally, this part will examine the doctrine of judicial
estoppel and its application in both civil and criminal cases.
A. The Use of DNA Testing in the CriminalJustice System
Today, DNA 26 testing is the foremost forensic technique for identifying
perpetrators and eliminating suspects when biological tissues such as saliva,
26. DNA is the abbreviation for deoxyribonucleic acid. DNA stores the genetic code of
the human body and determines an individual's personal characteristics, such as eye color,
hair color, and height. DNA is found in all human cells, including those found in saliva, skin
tissue, blood, the root and shaft of hair, bone, and semen. A person's DNA profile is the
same throughout the body, and does not change over the course of a person's life. While the
majority of DNA is identical in all humans, for each individual (except identical twins), the
sequence of the DNA "building blocks" is different in particular regions of the cell; this
makes each person's DNA unique. Moreover, if properly preserved, DNA from bones or
body fluid stains can be tested after many years in older cases in which questions of identity
remain unresolved or disputed. Thus, in many criminal cases, the DNA from any biological
evidence can be analyzed to reliably link criminals to crimes or clear people as suspects.
Nat'l Inst. of Justice, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Postconviction DNA Testing: Recommendations
for
Handling
Requests
105
(1999),
available
at
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/177626.pdf [hereinafter Recommendations].
For an
extensive review of the types of DNA testing used in forensic facilities today, including STR
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skin, blood, hair, or semen are left at a crime scene. 27 While biological
evidence has been of forensic significance for years through conventional
serology testing, DNA testing has made this type of evidence of far greater
significance because of its ability to positively exclude, or with a very high
degree of accuracy include, a specific 2individual
as the source of critical
8
biological evidence from a crime scene.
1. The Use of DNA Testing to Convict
Because of its unparalleled accuracy in identifying the source of
biological material, DNA testing has proven to be a powerful tool in the
fight against crime. 29 The nation's federal and state DNA databanks, which
contain inventories of DNA profiles from new and old unsolved cases and
from convicted offenders, are being used systematically to solve crimes at
an unprecedented rate. 30
For example, as of June 2004, Virginia
investigators had accumulated 2000 "cold hits" 3 1 using the state's DNA
databank, which was established in 1989.32 Furthermore, DNA testing has
proven to be such an effective law enforcement tool that two-thirds of
prosecutors' offices reportedly use DNA evidence during plea negotiations

testing, mtDNA testing, and Y-DNA testing, see id. at 26-29; Nat'l Inst. of Justice, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Using DNA to Solve Cold Cases 5-7 (2002), available at
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/194197.pdf.
27. Recommendations, supra note 26, at 1.
28. See Goldberg & Siegel, supranote 24, at 391 n.1.
29. Indeed, proponents of DNA testing, many of whom are defense attorneys, often hail
the benefits of DNA technology as a crime-fighting tool just as much as a means to prove
innocence. See, e.g., Protecting the Innocent: Proposals to Reform the Death Penalty:
Testimony of Prof Barry Scheck, Co-directorof the Innocence Project, and Member ofN.Y
State's Forensic Science Review Board, 107th Cong. 230 (2002) [hereinafter Protectingthe
Innocent] (stating how, as a commissioner on New York State's Forensic Science Review
Board, he spent significant time training and urging law enforcement to focus on old, "cold"
cases that could now be solved using DNA testing).
30. See Recommendations, supra note 26, at 1; see also Advancing Justice, supra note
23.
31. A "cold hit" occurs when a DNA profile developed from any biological fluid, tissue,
or hair recovered from a crime scene is matched to an individual in the state's convicted
offender DNA databank. Press Release, Governor Mark Warner's Office, Virginia's DNA
Databank
Scores
2,000th
Hit
(June
3,
2004),
available
at
http://www.governor.virginia.gov/PressPolicy/Releases/2004/JunO4/0603.htm.
32. Id.
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and felony trials. 3 3 Moreover, only one percent of prosecutors report
34
having had any difficulty in admitting inculpatory DNA evidence at trial.
2. The Use of DNA Testing to Prove Innocence: Pretrial Exclusions and
Post-conviction Exonerations
DNA testing is not only used to convict the guilty, but also to identify the
wrongly accused and convicted. 35 Crime laboratories estimate that, in cases
where the police request a comparison of DNA evidence from an unsolved
crime to a DNA sample from a known potential suspect, the analysis
excludes the suspect identified by investigators in approximately one-third
of the cases. 36 In 1995, the National Institute of Justice surveyed nineteen
public and private laboratories that conducted DNA analysis comparing
37
evidence from unsolved crimes to DNA samples from known suspects.
The results of this study indicate that police identified an innocent person as
a prime suspect in approximately one in four cases, 3 8 results which
33. Carol J. DeFrances, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, National
Survey of Prosecutors: Prosecutors in State Courts, 2001, at 8-9 (2002), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/psc01.pdf. Of the 2140 state prosecutor's offices
surveyed by the Department of Justice, all of the full-time large offices, 98% of full-time
medium offices, 73% of full-time small offices, and 38% of part-time offices reported using
DNA evidence during plea negotiations or felony trials. Id. at 8. This is a significant
increase from 1996, when approximately half of all prosecutors' offices reported using DNA
evidence during plea negotiations or felony trials. Id.
34. Id. at 9. But see People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 997-98 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County 1989) (holding that DNA evidence of exclusion is presumptively more admissible
than DNA evidence of inclusion).
35. See Recommendations, supra note 26, at 2.
36. Nicholas P. Lovrich et al., National Forensic DNA Study Report 68 (2003),
availableat http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/grants/203970.pdf.
37. Edward Connors et al., Nat'l Inst. of Justice, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Convicted by
Juries, Exonerated by Science: Case Studies in the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish
Innocence After Trial 20 (1996), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/dnaevid.pdf
[hereinafter Convicted by Juries]. Of the forty laboratories initially contacted by the
National Institute of Justice, only the data from nineteen were sufficient for the purposes of
the study. The nineteen consisted of thirteen state and local laboratories, four private
laboratories, an armed forces laboratory, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
laboratory. Id.
38. Id. An additional 16% of the cases yielded inconclusive results, often because the
test samples had deteriorated or were too small to be tested. Id. Inconclusive results aside,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") reported that, in the 10,060 cases it received,
DNA test results were approximately 20% exclusive and 20% inconclusive. Id The
remaining eighteen laboratories, contributing data from a total of 11,561 cases, reported
about 26% exclusive and 13% inconclusive DNA test results. Id. Omitting inconclusive
cases, the exclusion rate for the FBI would be approximately 25%, and the average exclusion
rate for the remaining eighteen laboratories would be about 30%. See id.; see also George C.
Thomas III et al., Is It Ever Too Late for Innocence? Finality,Efficiency, and Claims of
Innocence, 64 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 263, 271-72 (2003). Admittedly, these results must be
interpreted with caution, as there is no information given about the types of cases in the
sample. For example, it is possible that testing is only performed in cases in which law
enforcement has little or no other evidence, a category of cases that likely contains more
innocent suspects. Thomas et al., supra, at 272. It may also be true that crimes that lend
themselves to DNA testing (e.g., sexual assaults) are more likely to result in charges against
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"strongly suggest[] that postarrest and postconviction DNA exonerations
are tied to some strong, underlying' 39systemic problems that generate
erroneous accusations and convictions."
To date, the results of DNA testing have exonerated 163 people of the
crime or crimes for which they were wrongfully convicted.4 0 These
exonerations illustrate that DNA testing is a far more reliable and precise
method of identifying perpetrators of crime than any other form of
identification proof utilized by law enforcement, including eyewitness
identification, 4 1 confessions, 4 2 and more traditional forensic science
innocent suspects. Id. However, law enforcement has "a powerful incentive to seek DNA
testing in all cases" in which there is biological evidence, because if DNA test results
positively identify the suspect as the perpetrator, the State's case is strengthened immensely.
Id. It should also be noted that DNA testing is increasingly being used to solve property
crimes, not just those crimes that are traditionally thought of as appropriate for DNA testing,
such as sexual assaults. See, e.g., Bill Hughes & Richard Liebson, Look Out, Burglars,
DNA's on the Scene, J. News (Westchester County, NY), Apr. 2, 2004, at 1A (reporting that
a New York man was convicted of burglary after saliva left on the rim of a soda bottle found
at the crime scene matched a profile in New York's convicted offender databank).
39. Convicted by Juries, supra note 37, at xxviii-xxix. See also infra notes 41-44 and
accompanying text for an examination of some of the identified causes of wrongful
convictions.
40. See The Innocence Project, supra note 21. Fourteen of those exonerated had at one
time been sentenced to death. See Death Penalty Information Center, Innocence and the
Crisis
in
the
American
Death
Penalty,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=1149&scid=45
(last visited Sept. 28,
2005). Certainly, concerns about wrongful convictions did not arise with the advent of
forensic DNA testing; for many years scholars have investigated this problem. Keith A.
Findley, Learning from Our Mistakes: A Criminal Justice Commission to Study Wrongful
Convictions, 38 Cal. W. L. Rev. 333, 335 (2002). In 1932, Edward Borchard identified
sixty-five wrongful convictions. Edwin M. Borchard, Convicting the Innocent: Sixty-Five
Actual Errors of Criminal Justice (1932). By 1987, Hugo Bedau and Michael Radelet had
identified 350 wrongful convictions in cases where the convicted person could have faced
the death penalty. Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriage of Justice in
Potentially Capital Cases, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 21, 23-24 (1987). By 1992, that number had
increased to over 400 such cases. See Michael L. Radelet et al., In Spite of Innocence:
Erroneous Convictions in Capital Cases 272 (1992). For an extensive review of the
scholarship identifying wrongful convictions, see Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails:
Indemnificationfor Unjust Conviction, in University of Chicago Law School Roundtable 73,
75-80 (1999). It is also important to note that in about half of the cases in which postconviction DNA testing is conducted, the test results further implicate the defendant. The
Innocence Project, DNA News: Post-Conviction DNA Testing that Confirms Guilt,
http://innocenceproject.org/dnanews/index.php (last visited Sept. 28, 2005). For example,
Steven Holcomb was convicted of raping a thirteen-year-old girl in 1985. Angela Rozas,
Lawyers Halt Bid to Clear Inmate: DNA Test Links Convicted Rapist, Chi. Trib., Oct. 30,
2003, at 3. Post-conviction DNA testing conducted in 2002 on biological evidence from the
case resulted in a positive match to Holcomb. Id.
41. In approximately two-thirds of the post-conviction DNA exonerations to date,
mistaken eyewitness identifications played a large part in the original convictions. See The
Innocence
Project,
Causes
&
Remedies:
Mistaken
I.D.,
http://innocenceproject.org/causes/mistakenid.php (last visited Sept. 28, 2005). DNA testing
has demonstrated that single and even multiple eyewitness identifications can be erroneous.
See id. For example, Kirk Bloodsworth was convicted in 1985 for the 1984 sexual assault
and murder of a nine-year-old girl. Convicted by Juries, supra note 37, at 35-37.
Bloodsworth's conviction rested in large part on the testimony of five eyewitnesses, who
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methods such as conventional serology 43 analysis. 44 Furthermore, the use
of DNA technology brings to post-conviction proceedings a degree of
stated at trial that they had seen Bloodsworth with the victim prior to her murder. Id. at 36.
However, the results of post-conviction DNA testing performed in 1992 on the biological
evidence from this case excluded Bloodsworth as the source of the sperm found on the
victim's underwear and demonstrated that the five eyewitnesses were wrong. Id. at 36-37. In
1993, Bloodsworth was exonerated after serving over eight years in prison, two of which
were spent on death row. Paul W. Valentine, Jailedfor Murder, Freed by DNA: Md.
Waterman, Twice Convicted in Child's Death, Is Released, Wash. Post, June 29, 1993, at
Al. Furthermore, in 2003 the DNA profile matched that of a convicted sex offender whose
profile was in a state DNA databank and who was in prison for an attempted rape and
murder he committed just three weeks after the nine-year-old girl's murder. Stephanie
Hanes, '84 Investigation Quick to Overlook the Culprit, Balt. Sun, May 22, 2004, at 1A;
Andrea F. Siegel, Taking Felons' DNA in Dispute, Balt. Sun, June 7, 2004, at BI. For a
powerful account of a rape victim's certainty in identifying her attacker, which postconviction DNA testing later proved to be mistaken, see Jennifer Thompson, Op-Ed., I Was
Certain,But I Was Wrong, N.Y. Times, June 18, 2000, at 15.
42. Confessions are universally considered compelling evidence of guilt. Richard A. Leo
& Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and
Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 429, 429 (1998). However, of the 163 people exonerated by DNA evidence, at
least thirty-three were originally convicted at least in part on the basis of their false
confessions.
The
Innocence
Project,
Case
Profiles,
http://innocenceproject.org/case/index.php (last visited Sept. 28, 2005). The post-conviction
DNA exoneration cases in which defendants made incriminating statements or delivered
outright confessions demonstrate that a confession or admission is not always prompted by
internal knowledge or guilt, but instead may be motivated by external influences. The
Innocence
Project,
Causes
&
Remedies:
False
Confessions,
http://innocenceproject.org/causes/falseconfessions.php (last visited Sept. 28, 2005). Duress
and coercion are among the many factors that have led to false confessions. Id. For example,
Christopher Ochoa not only confessed to raping and killing a coworker, but also implicated
his friend Richard Danziger in the crime. Terrence Stutz, Freedom's Embrace: 12-Year
Prison Ordeal Ends for Man Cleared by DNA Evidence, Dallas Morning News, Jan. 17,
2001, at 1A. However, DNA testing on samples retained from the time of their 1989 trials
not only excluded both Ochoa and Danziger as sources of the biological evidence left by the
perpetrator, but also identified the true murderer. Id. Ochoa stated that his confession and
implication of Danziger were the results of police pressure and fear of the death penalty,
citing periods of time when the police threatened him with the consequences of not
confessing. Id. The exoneration in 2002 of the five teenagers who confessed to and were
convicted of raping, beating, and robbing the "Central Park Jogger" in 1989 further exposed
the prevalence of false confessions. See People v. Wise, 752 N.Y.S.2d 837 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 2002). Soon after the exonerations in the Central Park Jogger case, the American
Bar Association unanimously accepted a resolution that urges law enforcement agencies
around the country to videotape interrogations of criminal suspects to reduce the possibility
of coerced confessions. Susan Saulny, National Law Group Endorses Videotaping of
Interrogations,N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 2004, at B4.
43. Prior to the application of DNA testing to the criminal justice system, forensic
scientists were limited to the use of conventional serology analysis. The Innocence Project,
Causes and Remedies:
Serology, http://innocenceproject.org/causes/serology.php (last
visited Sept. 28, 2005). The term "conventional serology" refers to both ABO blood typing
and microscopic hair analysis, among other things. Id. ABO blood typing is a test that uses
antibodies to detect variations on the surface of human red blood cells and can be performed
on liquid or stains from a variety of bodily fluids (e.g., blood, saliva, semen, and vaginal
secretions). Recommendations, supra note 26, at 67. Humans have either A, B, 0, or AB
blood types, and one out of every three randomly selected pairs of individuals have the same
blood type. Id. For this reason, the National Institute of Justice recommends post-conviction
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certainty to which neither the defense nor the prosecution is accustomed. 4 5
In traditional appeals, the possibility that an original verdict will be
overturned is only suggested.46 By contrast, the introduction of DNA
47
evidence post-conviction may definitively prove innocence.
The purpose of post-conviction DNA analysis is to use advanced
scientific technology to test the State's identification proof-proof which a
jury, and reviewing courts, have already determined to be beyond a
DNA testing on evidence that was previously subjected only to blood typing analysis at the
time of trial, because "ABO blood testing.., results alone are not sufficiently discriminating
such that a falsely accused individual would necessarily be excluded" using these tests. Id. at
24. For example, in 1981 Calvin Willis was convicted and sentenced to life in prison for the
rape of a ten-year-old girl in Louisiana. His conviction was based partly on the results of
conventional serology analysis, which could not exclude Willis, a type 0 secretor, as the
contributor of seminal fluid with type 0 markers found on the victim's nightgown, in the
victim's underwear, and on a bedspread. See The Innocence Project, Case Profiles: Calvin
Willis, http://innocenceproject.org/case/displayprofile.php?id=138 (last visited Sept. 28,
2005). In 2003, however, Willis was exonerated after the results of post-conviction DNA
testing showed that he was in fact not the source of the semen. Id. Before the advent of
mitochondrial DNA testing, forensic scientists examined hair under a microscope for varying
and similar characteristics. See The Innocence Project, Causes and Remedies: Serology,
supra. Although this practice is highly subjective and very inaccurate with regard to
including or "matching" a suspect, hair analysis often determined the outcome of a trial due
to overstated statistics or the exaggeration of the probative value of microscopic hair
analysis. 1d. The case of Jimmy Ray Bromgard illustrates how post-conviction DNA testing
has exposed the weakness of hair comparison evidence. Bromgard was convicted of the
1987 rape of an eight-year-old girl, largely on the basis of testimony from the director of the
Montana State Crime Laboratory that head and pubic hairs found at the crime scene were
indistinguishable from Bromgard's hairs, and that there was a "1 in 10,000" chance that
Bromgard was not the source of both sets of hairs. Adam Liptak, 2 States to Review Lab
Work of Expert Who Erred on ID, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 2002, at A24. In 2002, however,
Bromgard was exonerated through the results of post-conviction DNA testing, and his
exoneration triggered a review by state authorities of the work of the forensic scientist who
testified at Bromgard's trial. Id. The recent holding of a U.S. district court that testimony
regarding microscopic hair analysis was inadmissible under the Daubert standard is further
evidence that microscopic hair analysis is now considered unreliable. See Williamson v.
Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1556 (E.D. Okla. 1995).
44. For studies that have identified the recurring factors which have contributed to
wrongful convictions, see, e.g., Convicted by Juries, supra note 37, at 15-18 (finding that the
major factors that led to the wrongful conviction of twenty-eight innocent people who were
eventually exonerated through DNA testing include: erroneous eyewitness identification,
reliance on erroneous or misleading forensic evidence, and alleged governmental
misconduct); Barry Scheck et al., Actual Innocence: When Justice Goes Wrong and How to
Make It Right 365 (2003) (concluding that, of 130 DNA-based exonerations in the United
States, mistaken eyewitness identification was a factor in 78% of the cases; false confessions
were present in 27%; jailhouse informants played a role in 16%; microscopic hair inclusions
were a factor in 16%; and 3% involved DNA inclusion at trial); Michael J. Saks et al.,
Toward a Model for the Prevention and Remedy of Erroneous Convictions, 35 New Eng. L.
Rev. 669, 671 (2001) (finding that, of eighty-one DNA exoneration cases, 74% involved
mistaken eyewitness identification; 65% involved erroneous forensic evidence; 39.5%
involved prosecutorial misconduct; 32% involved police misconduct; 31% involved
fraudulent or tainted evidence; 28% involved bad lawyering; 19% involved false
confessions; 17% involved informant testimony; and 17% involved false witness testimony).
45. Recommendations, supra note 26, at vi.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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reasonable doubt-to determine if a wrongful conviction has occurred. 4 8 In
many cases where convictions appeared to be based on solid, and in some
cases overwhelming, evidence, results of post-conviction DNA testing have
proven actual innocence. 49 Indeed, without DNA
testing, many of these
50
cases would never have been given any attention.
As the above analysis illustrates, no other evidence used in the criminal
justice system rivals DNA's "broadly applicable and uniquely dispositive
power." 5 1 In light of this, the DNA revolution and the resulting
exonerations have put the spotlight on prosecutors' treatment of innocencebased post-conviction motions. 52 The next section will detail how some
prosecutors oppose post-conviction claims of innocence based on
exculpatory DNA test results.
B. Prosecutors Challenge the Significance of Exculpatory Post-conviction
DNA Test Results in Light of Other Evidence of Guilt
Few prosecutors directly assert that the judicial system should permit the
incarceration of innocent people. 53 In fact, some prosecutors have initiated
programs to review past convictions and subject any remaining biological
evidence to DNA testing to ascertain whether an inmate was wrongly
convicted. 54 Furthermore, approximately half of the 163 DNA exonerees
obtained post-conviction DNA testing with the consent of local
55
prosecutors.
However, while there is no doubt that DNA technology has had a
profound impact on the criminal justice system, the system in which DNAbased post-conviction claims of innocence are brought is the same
adversarial system that led to the original convictions and in which all other
post-conviction claims are litigated. 56 Proponents of post-conviction DNA
testing argue that, as a result of the adversarial environment in which these
cases are litigated, many prosecutors exhibit indifference and, on occasion,
hostility to requests for and in reaction to the results of post-conviction
DNA testing. 57
48. See generally Convicted by Juries, supra note 37.

49. Double Helix, supra note 25, at 595; see also Editorial, Yet Another DNA
Exoneration, Wash. Post, Feb. 18, 2002, at A22.
50. See Findley, supra note 40, at 336.
51. Double Helix, supra note 25, at 595.
52. Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: ProsecutorialResistance to Post-Conviction

Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 125, 133 (2004).
53. Double Helix, supranote 25, at 553.
54. See id. at 557-59 (detailing the proactive efforts of prosecutors in San Diego,
Minnesota, and Orange County, California to review cases prosecuted before DNA was used
routinely by law enforcement in an attempt to identify any individuals who were wrongfully
convicted).
55. See The Innocence Project, Causes and Remedies: DNA, supra note 22.
56. Goldberg & Siegel, supra note 24, at 393.
57. See Medwed, supra note 52, at 129. For example, the deputy commonwealth's
attorney who handles requests for post-conviction DNA testing in Suffolk, Virginia has said
that it is his policy to "oppose them all," regardless of the merits of the request. Michelle
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For example, Florida prosecutors vigorously opposed Wilton Dedge's
efforts to prove his innocence of a 1982 rape for which he was convicted.
Initially, prosecutors opposed, on procedural grounds, Dedge's attempts to
obtain mitochondrial DNA testing on pubic hairs found in the rape victim's
bed, which prosecutors told the jury were Dedge's at his trial. 58 Over the
protests of prosecutors, however, a court granted Dedge access to the pubic
hairs in 2000, and DNA test results indicated that the hairs did not originate
from Dedge. 59 Nevertheless, for three additional years the State opposed
60
Dedge's motion for a new trial on the basis of the exculpatory test results.
Specifically, prosecutors changed their strategy from trial and argued that
the pubic hairs were insignificant, 61 and thus the DNA test results were
insufficient to overcome the other evidence linking Dedge to the crimenamely, the victim's identification of Dedge and the alleged confession
62
Dedge gave to a jailhouse informant who testified against him at trial.
The State did not relent in its opposition until the results of a second set of
DNA tests, conducted in 2004 on semen samples from the case long
believed to be too degraded for testing, conclusively excluded Dedge as the

Washington & Tim McGlone, Warner Weighs Plan to Test Crime DNA, Virginian-Pilot,
Sept. 4, 2004, at A16. In Virginia Beach, Virginia, prosecutors opposed six of the seven
DNA test requests received since the state's post-conviction DNA testing statute was passed
in 2001. Id. This behavior is surprising, to say the least, considering that the results of postconviction DNA testing have exonerated eight men of rape and/or murder convictions in
Virginia. Id. In fact, David Vasquez of Virginia was the one of the first people in the
country who was exonerated through post-conviction DNA testing. See The Innocence
Project, Case Profiles, supra note 42.
58. Martin Dyckman, Infamous Justice, St. Petersburg Times, Aug. 22, 2004, at IP.
Specifically, the State argued that, under longstanding court rules, it was too late for Dedge
to get his conviction overturned--even if Dedge was not the source of the biological
evidence from this case. Id. In fact, an assistant attorney general went so far as to say that,
even if she knew Dedge was innocent, it would not change the belief that his requests must
be denied because they were procedurally barred. Id. The State also argued that Dedge's
lawyers should have requested DNA testing much earlier, and added that it was up to the
courts-not the State-to waive Florida's two-year time rule and release the evidence for
testing. Sydney P. Freedberg, DNA Testing Deniedto Inmates Seeking Justice, St. Petersburg
Times, June 21, 1999, at IA.
59. Laurin Sellers, DNA Test Prompts BrevardMan to Seek 3rd Trial, Orlando Sentinel,
July 15, 2002, at Al.
60. Editorial, Innocence Lost, St. Petersburg Times, Aug. 22, 2004, at 2P.
61. Id. At trial, prosecutors presented expert testimony that pubic hairs found in the
victim's bed were microscopically identical to Dedge's and could be his; furthermore,
prosecutors argued to the jury in their closing argument that the man who committed the
crime "would have pubic hair identical to Wilton Dedge-Dedge's pubic hairs." Sellers,
supra note 59.
62. See Sellers, supra note 59. The State also reiterated its belief that, regardless of the
results, the DNA test results should not be considered because the testing occurred before the
enactment of statutory rules on DNA testing, and that, in the interest of finality, Dedge
should remain in prison regardless of whether he did the crime or not. Innocence Lost, supra
note 60.

FORDHAMLA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 74

rapist. 63 Dedge was released from a Florida prison on August 12, 2004,
64
after spending twenty-two years in prison for a crime he did not commit.
Defense attorneys have tried various measures to prevent prosecutors
from reversing course and changing their stories from trial when opposing
DNA-based post-conviction claims of innocence. Specifically, defense
attorneys have utilized two novel legal approaches to this problem, albeit
with limited success thus far. 65 First, defense attorneys argue that DNAbased post-conviction motions for relief are more appropriately analyzed
66
under the harmless error doctrine than the newly discovered evidence test.
Secondly, defense attorneys request that courts apply the doctrine of

judicial estoppel to bar prosecutors from making arguments
that are
67
inconsistent with the theory of the case presented at trial.
The next section will introduce the newly discovered evidence test, under
which courts currently analyze DNA-based post-conviction claims of
innocence. The next part will also introduce the harmless error doctrine,
which courts use to analyze claims of constitutional error at trial.
C. Standardof Review

Currently, most courts analyze DNA-based post-conviction claims of
innocence under the newly discovered evidence test. 68 To warrant the
granting of a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence, the
convicted offender must show that the evidence: (1) has been discovered

since the trial; (2) could not have been discovered before the trial by the
exercise of due diligence; (3) is material to the issue; (4) is not merely
cumulative or impeaching; and (5) will probably change the result if a new
trial is granted. 69

The question of whether the evidence would probably

change the result if a new trial were granted is what is typically litigated in
post-conviction proceedings where the new evidence the petitioner seeks to
introduce are the results of post-conviction DNA testing, and it is under this

63. See Innocence Lost, supra note 60.
64. See Dyckman, supra note 58. Dedge was the 147th DNA exoneree. In the fourteen
months since Dedge's exoneration, DNA test results have been used to exonerate sixteen
additional
prisoners.
See
The
Innocence
Project,
http://innocenceproject.org/case/display-cases.php?sort=year-exoneration&start= 141 &end=
160
(last
visited
Sept.
28,
2005);
The
Innocence
Project,
http://innocenceproject.org/case/displaycases.php?sort=year-exoneration&start= 161 &end=
163 (last visited Oct. 11, 2005).
65. See Defendant's Petition for Review and Appeal at 12, State v. Armstrong, 2005 WI
119, 700 N.W.2d 98 (Nos. 01-2789 & 02-2979), 2005 Wisc. LEXIS 356 [hereinafter Petition
for Review] (copy on file with the Fordham Law Review).
66. See State v. Armstrong, Nos. 01-2789 & 02-2979, 2004 Wisc. App. LEXIS 453, at
**21 (Wis. Ct. App. May 27, 2004), rev'd on other grounds, 2005 WI 119, 700 N.W.2d 98;
see also Petition for Review, supra note 65, at 24-25.
67. See Armstrong, 2004 Wisc. App. Lexis 453 at **18-19.
68. See id. at **21-23.
69. 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial § 312 (2002); see also United States v. Schwartzbaum,
527 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Bostic, 360 F. Supp. 1305 (E.D. Pa. 1973);
United States v. Puco, 338 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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prong of the newly discovered evidence test that prosecutors justify their
attempts to introduce new theories of the crime.70 Specifically, prosecutors
argue that they are permitted to present new theories of the crime to refute
the petitioner's contention that the DNA1 evidence would result in a
7
different outcome if admitted at a new trial.
To prevent prosecutors from being able to introduce new theories of the
crime in post-conviction proceedings, defense attorneys have advocated that
72
courts adopt a new standard of review, analogous to the harmless error
test, for those cases in which a petitioner introduces DNA evidence that
73
demonstrates that the trial court admitted erroneous scientific evidence.
Under the proposed test, the State would bear the burden of proving that the
introduction at trial of forensic evidence implicating the defendant as the
perpetrator of the crime, which post-conviction DNA testing proves did not
actually originate from the defendant, did not affect the jury's decision to
find the petitioner guilty. 74 Imposing such a burden on the State would
potentially have the practical effect of compelling the State to argue within
the bounds of the theory it introduced at trial. However, although at least
one court has recognized that there are compelling reasons why the
harmless error doctrine is a more appropriate test for analyzing these
particular post-conviction claims of innocence, no court has yet adopted this
75
as the standard of review for this discrete category of case.
The next section introduces another approach defense attorneys have
undertaken in an attempt to make prosecutors stick to their stories from trial
when the results of post-conviction DNA testing are exculpatory:
requesting that the court judicially estop prosecutors from presenting a
position in post-conviction proceedings that is inconsistent with what the
State argued at trial.
D. JudicialEstoppel
Defense attorneys have recently begun to request that courts apply the
doctrine of judicial estoppel against the State to bar prosecutors from

70. See Commonwealth v. Reese, 663 A.2d 206, 209 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
71. Id.

72. Harmless error is defined as "any error, defect, irregularity or variance that does not

affect substantial rights." Fed. R. Crim. P. 52. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52 directs
that such errors "must be disregarded." Id. The Supreme Court has held that the appropriate
test for determining whether a technical error is harmless-that is, non-prejudicial-is
whether the reviewing court can say with fair assurance, after considering all the
circumstances, that the judgment was not substantially affected by the error. See, e.g.,
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946). Thus, when reviewing a jury trial, the
court must consider what effect the error had or reasonably may have had upon the jury's
decision, not whether the jury was right in its judgment regardless of the error. Id.
73. See Armstrong, 2004 Wisc. App. LEXIS 453 at **21-22.
74. Id. at **21.
75. See id. For a discussion of the court's reluctance to apply the harmless error doctrine
in the case of State v. Armstrong, see infra Part II.C.3.
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making arguments in post-conviction proceedings that are contrary to the
theory of the case introduced at trial.
1. The Policy Underlying the Application of Judicial Estoppel
Judicial estoppel is a doctrine that "prevents a party from contradicting
previous declarations made during the same or an earlier proceeding if the
change in position would adversely affect the proceeding or constitute a
fraud on the court."' 76 Courts' invocation of the doctrine generally
precludes a party from prevailing in one phase of a case on one argument
and then relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in another phase of
77
the same litigation.
Protecting the integrity of the judicial process is the universally
recognized purpose of judicial estoppel, 78 and courts' use of the doctrine
accomplishes this goal by "prohibiting parties from deliberately changing
positions according to the exigencies of the moment."' 79 Because the rule is
intended to prevent the improper use of the judicial system, judicial
80
estoppel is an equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion.
The use of judicial estoppel advances several policy aims. 8 1 First, courts
invoke the doctrine to preserve the sanctity of litigants' oath. 82 In order to
avoid the appearance of condoning the behavior of a party who takes its
oath lightly, courts bind parties to what they have said in judicial
proceedings. 83 Second, courts invoke the doctrine "to avoid the incongruity
of inconsistent decisions between courts," 84 and because allowing
inconsistent positions is thought to bring the judicial system into disrepute;
the use of judicial estoppel thus "'safeguard[s] the administration of
justice... and thereby preserve[s] the public confidence in the purity and

76. Black's Law Dictionary 590-91 (8th ed. 2004); see also Wabash Grain, Inc. v.
Smith, 700 N.E.2d 234, 237 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (observing that judicial estoppel prevents a
party from asserting a position in a legal proceeding inconsistent with one previously
asserted).
77. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 227 n.8 (2000); see also 18 James Wm. Moore et
al., Moore's Federal Practice § 134.30 (3d ed. 1997) ("The doctrine of judicial estoppel
prevents a party from asserting a claim in a legal proceeding that is inconsistent with a claim
taken by that party in a previous proceeding."); 18B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal
Practice and Procedure § 4477 (2d ed. 2002) ("Absent any good explanation, a party should
not be allowed to gain an advantage by litigation on one theory, and then seek an
inconsistent advantage by pursuing an incompatible theory.").
78. See 18 Moore et al., supra note 77, § 134.31.
79. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749-50 (2001) (citations omitted).
80. Id. at 750.
81. Ashley S. Deeks, Comment, Raising the Cost of Lying: Rethinking Eriefor Judicial
Estoppel, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 873, 875 (1997).
82. See Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cited in Deeks,
supra note 81, at 875 n.5.
83. Id.; see also Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 598-99 (6th Cir. 1982).
84. Decks, supranote 81, at 875.
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efficiency of judicial proceedings.' ' 8 5 Additionally, courts apply judicial
estoppel to avoid being misled by litigants; in this sense, the doctrine
"operates to prevent a party from insulting a court through improper use of
judicial machinery. '86 Courts also use judicial estoppel to prevent litigants
from using the courts for undeserved personal gain; thus, for example, in
civil cases courts invoke the doctrine to bar litigants from obtaining
multiple recoveries from opponents or to present multiple theories until a
court finally allows recovery based on one. 8 7 Finally, courts employ the
doctrine to minimize the misuse of judicial resources by reducing the
88
number of illegitimate claims they must hear.
2. Judicial Estoppel in Civil Cases
Judicial estoppel is most often invoked in civil cases. 89 In the civil
context, there is no "one size fits all" judicial estoppel rule, 90 and courts
have observed that "'the circumstances under which judicial estoppel may
appropriately be invoked are probably not reducible to any general
formulation of principle."' 9 1 Nevertheless, in civil cases, courts typically
examine the following factors in determining whether to apply the doctrine
in a particular case. First, a party's later position must be "'clearly
inconsistent'
with its earlier position. 92 This is not limited to
representations made by a party within the same legal proceedings, but
rather applied to inconsistent claims raised by a party in separate or
subsequent legal proceedings. 93 Second, courts ask whether the party has
succeeded in persuading a court to accept that party's earlier position, so
that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later proceeding
would create "the perception that either the first or the second court was
85. Rand G. Boyers, Precluding Inconsistent Statements: The Doctrine of Judicial
Estoppel, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1244, 1245 (1986) (quoting Melton v. Anderson, 222 S.W.2d
666, 669 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948)).
86. Deeks, supra note 81, at 875 (quoting Konstantinidis,626 F.2d at 938).
87. Id. (citing McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 617-18 (3d Cir. 1996)). In
McNemar, the court applied judicial estoppel against a plaintiff who had been granted
disability benefits on the grounds that he was totally disabled, which barred him from
recovering against his employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act on the grounds
that he was terminated despite being a qualified person with a disability who could perform
the essential functions of his job. 91 F.3d at 617-18.
88. Deeks, supra note 81, at 876.
89. See Smith v. State, 765 N.E.2d 578, 582-83 (Ind.2002); Poulin, supra note 25, at
1451-52.
90. Hardy v. Hardy, No. 496-274, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23938, at *14 (S.D. Ga. Oct.
6, 1997).
91. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 (2001) (quoting Allen v. Zurich Ins.
Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1166 (4th Cir. 1982)).
92. Id. at 750 (quoting United States v. Hook, 195 F.3d 299, 306 (7th Cir. 1999)).
93. Wabash Grain, Inc. v. Smith, 700 N.E.2d 234, 238 n.7 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (citing
28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 69 (1966) ("The rule against inconsistent positions
applies generally to positions assumed not only in the course of the same action or
proceeding, but also in proceedings supplemental thereto ...and even in separate actions or
proceedings involving the same parties and questions.")).
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misled."' 94 Without success in a prior proceeding, a party's later
inconsistent position introduces no "risk of inconsistent court
determinations," 95 and thus poses little threat to judicial integrity. 96 A third
factor courts consider is "whether the party seeking to assert an inconsistent
position would derive an unfair advantage
or impose an unfair detriment on
97
the opposing party if not estopped."
There is no uniform stance on the specific types of behavior that threaten
judicial integrity. 98 It has been suggested, however, that judicial estoppel
"be applied with caution and in the narrowest of circumstances" to avoid
impinging on the truth-seeking function of the court, 99 which can occur
because the doctrine precludes the presentation of a contradictory position
without examining the truth of either statement. 10 0 "Indeed, the courts
appear consciously to leave the doctrine's boundaries vague, since 'it may
be advisable not to prescribe too many rules for the application of a doctrine
designed to protect the integrity of the courts."' 10 1 Leaving the application
of judicial estoppel to the courts' discretion thus permits each court to
respond to the specific inconsistency targeted by the request for the
102
invocation of the doctrine.
3. Judicial Estoppel in Criminal Cases
Judicial estoppel is applied much less frequently in the criminal context
than in civil cases. 10 3 On the rare occasions that the doctrine is invoked in
criminal cases, it is typically applied against a defendant who asserts one
position at trial and another on appeal. 10 4 Nevertheless, courts hearing
criminal cases have indicated that the doctrine could be invoked to preclude

94. New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750 (quoting Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d
595, 599 (6th Cir. 1982)).
95. Id.at 751 (quoting United States v. C.I.T. Constr. Inc., 944 F.2d 253, 259 (5th Cir.
1991)).
96. Id.; see also Wabash, 700 N.E.2d at 237-38; Deeks, supra note 81, at 873 ("Judicial
estoppel ...protects the integrity of the judicial process by preventing litigants from
engaging in self-serving self-contradiction.").
97. New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 751; see also Scarano v. Cent. R.R. Co. of N.J., 203
F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953).
98. Poulin, supra note 25, at 1452.
99. Lamonds v. Gen. Motors Corp., 34 F. Supp. 2d 391, 394 (W.D. Va. 1999).
100. Vowers & Sons, Inc. v. Strasheim, 576 N.W.2d 817, 824 (Neb. 1998) (quoting
Melcher v. Bank of Madison, 539 N.W.2d 837, 842 (Neb. 1995)).
101. Deeks, supra note 81, at 876 (quoting In re Cassidy, 892 F.2d 637, 642 (7th Cir.
1990)); see also Dush v. Appleton Elec. Co., 124 F.3d 957, 960 (8th Cir. 1997).
102. Poulin, supra note 25, at 1452.
103. See Smith v. State, 765 N.E.2d 578, 582-83 (Ind.2002).
104. State v. Towery, 920 P.2d 290, 304 (Ariz. 1996); see also State v. Michels, 414
N.W.2d 311, 317 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (estopping a defendant who requested at trial the
lesser included charge of manslaughter from arguing on appeal that there was insufficient
evidence to support a conviction on that charge).
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the State from changing its version of the facts of a case in separate
proceedings involving the same matter, 10 5 because
[a]ny other rule would permit absurd results. For example, if the state had
evidence that a defendant admitted robbing the convenience store, absent
judicial estoppel the state could use that evidence to convict the defendant
of every convenience store robbery in the city, affirming the evidence as
relevant in each case, all the while
knowing that the defendant made only
10 6
one admission of a single act.
In general, courts condition the application of the doctrine in the criminal
context on three requirements: (1) The parties must be the same, (2) the
question or facts involved must be the same, and (3) the party asserting the
inconsistent position
must have been successful in the prior judicial
10 7
proceeding.
Although most jurisdictions theoretically allow the invocation of the
doctrine against the State, in practice judicial estoppel offers little
protection for criminal defendants 10 8 because most courts have resisted
applying the doctrine in criminal cases. 10 9 Part II.D will examine the
controversy of applying the doctrine in criminal cases, as well as the
arguments for and against the use of the doctrine to limit the actions of
prosecutors in innocence-based post-conviction proceedings.
II. DOES THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM PERMIT PROSECUTORS TO CHANGE THEIR
STORY FROM TRIAL IN RESPONSE TO EXCULPATORY POST-CONVICTION
DNA TEST RESULTS?

This part first describes the arguments prosecutors have made in
opposition to convicted offenders' motions for a new trial on the basis of
exculpatory post-conviction DNA test results, arguments which are
arguably inconsistent with the theory of the crime presented by the State at
the offenders' original trials. Part II.B reviews defense arguments against
these prosecutorial tactics.
Part II.C then describes how the new
prosecution theories fare under the newly discovered evidence test, which
traditionally governs the specific motions for post-conviction relief. Part
II.C also analyzes a new standard, analogous to the harmless error doctrine,
that is arguably a more appropriate standard under which these claims
should be analyzed. Finally, Part II.D explores the arguments for and
against applying judicial estoppel to prevent prosecutors from making
arguments inconsistent with those which the State successfully maintained
at trial.

105. Towery, 920 P.2d at 304 (citing People v. Gayfield, 633 N.E.2d 919, 924-25 (I11.
App. Ct. 1994)); see also Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033, 1037-39 (9th Cir. 1990).
106. Towery, 920 P.2d at 304.
107. Id.; State v. Armstrong, Nos. 01-2789 & 02-2979, 2004 Wisc. App. LEXIS 453, at
**19 (Wis. Ct. App. May 27, 2004), rev'don other grounds, 2005 WI 119, 700 N.W.2d 98.
108. Poulin, supra note 25, at 1451-52.
109. Id. at 1452.
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A. ProsecutorialArguments Contestingthe Probative Value of
Exculpatory Post-convictionDNA Test Results
1. Exculpatory Post-conviction DNA Test Results Do Not Prove Innocence
in Light of Other Evidence of Guilt
In an effort to maintain convictions they believe were based on sufficient
evidence and to preserve limited resources for pending cases, prosecutors
have made various arguments in opposing motions for new trials or for the
vacatur of convictions when the results of DNA testing indicate that
petitioners are innocent of the crime for which they were convicted.11 0 For
example, some prosecutors who relied on now-rudimentary forensic science
(such as ABO blood typing or microscopic hair analysis) to convict a
defendant argue that the results of state-of-the-art post-conviction DNA
111
testing on the same biological evidence are not proof of innocence.
Although the prosecutors who make these arguments concede that DNA
can prove whether someone is associated with a given piece of biological
evidence, they insist that, in the context of post-conviction proceedings, this
is not the same thing as proving whether or not a defendant committed a
crime. 112
They argue that the power of DNA evidence must be
reconsidered in the post-conviction context, contending that its usefulness
to prove innocence is overstated in cases where there is other compelling
evidence of guilt. 113
Prosecutors made this sort of argument in opposition to Bruce
Godschalk's claims of innocence. Godschalk was convicted in 1987 of two
rapes, largely on the basis of his confession and serology evidence that
Godschalk's blood type matched that of the semen recovered from the first
rape victim. 11 4 In 2002, after eight years of protracted litigation to obtain
DNA testing, two sets of DNA tests performed on the biological evidence
from this case, including one performed by a laboratory chosen by the
115
prosecution, excluded Godschalk as the source of the semen.
Regardless, the prosecutor initially refused to consent to Godschalk's
release on the basis of the test results, explaining that although he had "no
scientific basis" to disagree with the test results, he placed more trust in the
110. See, e.g., Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 25, at 610-11; Charles I. Lugosi,
Punishing the Factually Innocent: DNA, Habeas Corpus and Justice, 12 Geo. Mason U.

Civ. Rts. L.J. 233, 235 (2002); see also Medwed, supra note 52, at 132-69 (investigating the
institutional, psychological, and political pressures prosecutors face to maintain convictions).
111. See Adam Liptak, Prosecutors Fight DNA Use for Exoneration, N.Y. Times, Aug.
29, 2003, at Al.
112. See id.
113. See id; John Juhala, False Exclusions?, 37 Jurimetrics J. 325, 325-26 (1997). But
see supra notes 41-42 on the problems with the other types of evidence prosecutors cite as
sufficiently incriminating to justify upholding convictions despite exculpatory DNA test
results.
114. See Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 25, at 548-49.
115. See Sara Rimer, DNA Testing in Rape Cases Frees PrisonerAfter 15 Years, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 15, 2002, at A12.
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"detective and [the] tape recorded confession."' 16 According to the
prosecutor, "the results must be flawed until someone proves...
1
otherwise." 17
In the case of Wilton Dedge, a Florida man who was recently released
after serving twenty-two years in prison for a rape that he did not commit,
the prosecutor argued that the exculpatory results from DNA testing
performed on pubic hairs from the crime scene did not prove Dedge's
innocence. 1 18 He did this despite asserting in his closing arguments at trial
that the man who committed the crime "would have pubic hair identical to
Wilton Dedge-Dedge's pubic hairs." 119 After the DNA testing, the
prosecutor pointed to the victim's identification 20 and the testimony of an
arguably unreliable jailhouse informant to argue that Dedge was guilty
despite the exculpatory results. 12 1 In this case, prosecutors relented only
after a second round of DNA tests excluded Dedge as the source of semen
122
found in the victim.

2. New Theories of the Crime Explain How a Convicted Person Is Guilty
Despite Exculpatory DNA Test Results
Prosecutors also create new theories of how crimes occurred, which the
State did not present to the judges and juries at the original trials, to explain
how the person convicted of the crime is guilty despite post-conviction
DNA test results that exclude the convicted offender as a source of the
biological evidence left by the perpetrator at the crime scene or on the
victim. 123 For example, prosecutors hypothesize about the existence of
"unindicted co-ejaculators"' 124 to explain how a defendant is guilty, even
116. See Sara Rimer, Convict's DNA Sways Labs, Not a Determined Prosecutor, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 6, 2002, at A14.
117. See id. The prosecutor ultimately consented to Godschalk's release, but not because
he believed Godschalk was innocent; instead, the prosecutor said that on the basis of the
DNA test results, he did not think there was sufficient evidence to convict Godschalk beyond
a reasonable doubt, "and in this business a tie goes to the defendant." Rimer, supra note 115,
at A12.
118. Sellers, supra note 59.
119. Id.
120. For a brief synopsis of the unreliability of eyewitness testimony, see supra note 41.
121. See Liptak, supra note 111.
122. See Dyckman, supra note 58; InnocenceLost, supra note 60.
123. See Lugosi, supra note 110, at 235.
124. See Frontline: The Case for Innocence (PBS television broadcast, Jan. 2000)
(transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/case/etc/script.html).
Peter Neufeld, Codirector of the Innocence Project, articulates the theory of the "unindicted
co-ejaculator" and other theories prosecutors have invented in response to exculpatory postconviction DNA test results as follows:
In almost all of [the Innocence Project] cases, the prosecutor's theory of the case
was that one person alone seized the woman, raped her, and then left her. Once we
get the DNA exclusion, a whole range of new prosecution theories emerge. There
is the theory of the unindicted co-ejaculator. This is a person who obviously
comes out of nowhere, and while our client is holding the woman down, this other
person actually rapes the victim. Then there is the theory that, "Ah-ha! This
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though the results of post-conviction DNA testing indicate that another
man's sperm was found in the victim. 125 For example, when postconviction DNA test results excluded Earl Washington as the source of the
sperm found in the body of the woman he had been convicted of raping and
murdering, prosecutors invoked the "unindicted co-ejaculator" theory and
argued that some unidentified accomplice joined Washington in raping and
killing the victim. 126

These arguments directly contradicted the State's

reliance at trial on Washington's confession, which made no mention of any
accomplice. 127 Further, this theory also contradicted a statement made by
the victim to both her husband and a police officer before she died from
128
injuries sustained in the attack that she had been raped by only one man.
B. Defense Arguments Asserting that ExculpatoryPost-convictionDNA
Test Results Prove Innocence
1. The Contention that DNA Test Results Can Prove Guilt but Not
Innocence Is a Double Standard
Critics of prosecutors who downplay the probative value of exculpatory
post-conviction DNA test results argue that such prosecutors have created
"a double standard[.] Evidence ... considered more than sufficient by
prosecutors if it establishes guilt [is] questionable or insufficient if it
establishe[s] innocence." 129
Furthermore, the National Institute of

person wore a condom and, in fact, she had consensual sex with someone else
shortly before." This theory is put forward even in the face of documentation
where the victim told the doctors "I have not had any intercourse with anybody in
the last 72 hours." Then there is the theory of a victim who's lying, because if all
else fails, they've got to say their own victim is lying and she doesn't want to
admit that she had some kind of illicit sex because she's married, because she has a
boyfriend, because she's engaged, whatever. Even though the victim swears she
didn't, even though there's no evidence that she did, they still throw this out there.
And it's not-it's not believable, but that doesn't stop them from trying.
Id.; see also supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text (detailing the arguments made by
prosecutors when the results of post-conviction DNA testing excluded Roy Criner as the
source of the semen found in the victim's body).
125. See James S. Liebman, The New Death Penalty Debate: What's DNA Got to Do
with It?, 33 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 527, 543 (2002).
126. See Bill Miller, Wilder Undecided on DNA-Based Pleafor Pardon,Wash. Post, Dec.
31, 1993, at D6; Four Cases, supra note 1.
127. See Frontline: The Case for Innocence: Earl Washington, Jr.: An Innocent Man,
Excerpt
from
Petition
for
Executive
Pardon
(Dec.
20,
1993),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/case/cases/petitionwashington.html.
The
governor of Virginia pardoned Washington on Oct. 2, 2000, after DNA testing found no
trace of his DNA on any of the evidence from the crime scene. See Four Cases, supra note
1.
128. See Frontline: The Case for Innocence: Earl Washington, Jr.: An Innocent Man,
Excerpt from Petition for Executive Pardon, supranote 127.
129. Liptak, supra note 111. See also supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text
regarding the widespread use of DNA testing to convict.
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Justice1 30 has recognized that "DNA is a useful and neutral tool in the
search for justice. It can cut both ways: DNA evidence can help prove
innocence or guilt.' 13 1 In fact, one court has suggested that DNA
identification evidence of exclusion is presumptively
more admissible than
32
DNA identification evidence of inclusion. 1
2. Defendants Argue that Prosecutors Should Not Be Allowed to Create
New Theories of the Crime in the Face of Exculpatory Post-conviction
DNA Test Results
Critics also argue that the State's creation of a new theory of the crime
after conviction is, by definition, a concession that the prosecution's
original theory was wrong and that the original trial verdict is thus
unreliable. 133 Furthermore, defense attorneys and judges alike have argued
that, if the results of post-conviction DNA testing are so compelling that
they cast doubt on the theory of the case that the prosecution presented at
trial, then at the very least a petitioner should be afforded a new trial, where
the prosecution's new theory can be tested and accepted or rejected by a
jury.

134

C. Standardof Review for Post-conviction Proceedings
Prosecutors who make these arguments assert that they are legitimate,
given the burden shifting that traditionally occurs post-conviction. 135 The
post-conviction phase of a criminal case creates a role reversal for the
130. The National Institute of Justice is the research, development, and evaluation agency
of the U.S. Department of Justice. About NIJ, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/about.htm (last
visited Sept. 28, 2005).
131. Recommendations, supra note 26, at 107.
132. See People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 997-98 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1989)
(holding that DNA test results could be used to show that blood on the defendant's watch
was not his, but that test results could not be used to show that the blood was that of his
alleged victims).
133. Petition for Review, supra note 65, at 29-30.
134. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Reese, 663 A.2d 206, 210 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995);
Petition for Review, supra note 65, at 28-29; BairdInterview, supra note 9. Judge Charles
Baird of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dissented in the case of Roy Criner. Id.In an
interview for the PBS documentary "Frontline: The Case for Innocence," Judge Baird
stated,
When the state prosecuted Mr. Criner, they theorized that Mr. Criner did not wear
a condom, that he did ejaculate, and that his semen was recovered from the
victim .... What they have done, and I think improperly so, is to create or invent

reasons that explain away the DNA evidence. But those reasons were never
presented to a jury, and that's the basis of the entire judicial system-you put those
facts before 12 individual citizens, and let them decide if that evidence is reliable
and believable, or not .... If the state thinks they have another theory of
prosecution that they can prove beyond a reasonable doubt, then let them
do that.
Id.
135. See Frontline: The Case for Innocence: Interview with Barry Scheck (PBS
television broadcast May 1, 2003); Keller Interview, supra note 4.
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respective parties. 13 6 During trial, the defendant is presumed innocent and
the prosecution bears the burden of proof. 13 7 Once a defendant has been
given a fair trial and convicted of the offense for which he was charged,
however, the presumption of innocence disappears. 138 In the context of
traditional post-conviction proceedings, then, the convicted offender is
presumed guilty, and it is he or she who bears the burden of proving
139
otherwise.
Which party carries the burden of proof in innocence-based, and
specifically DNA-based, post-conviction proceedings is not necessarily a
settled issue. While DNA-based post-conviction claims of innocence are
typically analyzed under the newly discovered evidence test, some defense
attorneys argue that courts should analyze such claims under the harmless
40
error standard. 1
1. The Newly Discovered Evidence Test
In those jurisdictions in which DNA-based post-conviction claims of
innocence are analyzed under the newly discovered evidence standard,
convicted offenders bear the burden of proving, among other things, that the
test results are truly exculpatory and would result in a different outcome if
admitted at a new trial. 14 1 To refute petitioners' contention that the
admission of exculpatory DNA test results would do just that, prosecutors
present new theories of the crime or downplay the importance of the
biological evidence in light of other evidence suggesting guilt, 142 and courts
have largely allowed prosecutors to make such arguments in post43
conviction proceedings. 1
At least one court, however, has held that it would be improper to
consider the State's alternative explanations for the presence of biological
evidence, which post-conviction DNA test results demonstrate did not
originate from the person convicted of the crime, in determining whether
the admission of the DNA evidence would likely have resulted in a
different verdict, because the jury did not hear this evidence at trial.144 In

136.
137.
138.
139.

Goldberg & Siegel, supra note 24, at 410.
Id.
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 399 (1993).
See Goldberg & Siegel, supra note 24, at 410.

140. See, e.g., State v. Armstrong, Nos. 01-2789 & 02-2979, 2004 Wisc. App. LEXIS
453, at **22-23 (Wis. Ct. App. May 27, 2004), rev'd on other grounds, 2005 WI 119, 700
N.W.2d 98.
141. See, e.g., People v. Dabbs, 587 N.Y.S.2d 90, 92 (Sup. Ct. 1991); Commonwealth v.
Reese, 663 A.2d 206, 209 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995); Armstrong, 2004 Wisc. App. LEXIS 453, at
**22-24.

142. See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text. See generally Armstrong, 2004 Wisc.
App. LEXIS 453, at **18-19.
143. See, e.g., Keller Interview, supra note 4 (discussing the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals consideration of the State's alternate explanations for the presence of semen that did
not originate from Criner in denying Criner's motion for a new trial).
144. See Reese, 663 A.2d at 210.
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Commonwealth v. Reese, 14 5 post-conviction DNA testing excluded the
person who had been convicted of a rape as the source of seminal fluid
found on the clothing worn by the victim on the night of the attack. 146 The
petitioner moved for a new trial on the basis of these test results, which the
Commonwealth opposed.14 7 To rebut the petitioner's claims that the DNA
test results were truly exculpatory, the Commonwealth argued that the
evidence it sought to admit offered a "reasonable explanation as to why [the
petitioner] was not linked through the DNA testing to the seminal fluid"
found on the clothing that the victim was wearing the night she was
attacked. 148 Specifically, the Commonwealth sought to offer evidence that
the rapist did not ejaculate during the attack and that the victim was
regularly engaging in sexual intercourse with her boyfriend at the time of
the rape. 14 9 Finding that it would be improper for the court to consider
these "explanations" in determining whether the DNA test results were
truly exculpatory, 150 the court granted Reese's motion for a new trial,
noting that the Commonwealth's proposed evidence may be appropriately
admitted only as rebuttal testimony in a new trial. 15 1 In those jurisdictions
where courts analyze DNA-based post-conviction claims of innocence
under the newly discovered evidence test, petitioners, using the logic of the
court's decision in Reese, argue that the very fact that prosecutors must
change their theory of the crime to explain away the exculpatory results of
DNA testing warrants the court granting the petitioner a new trial on the
152
basis of newly discovered evidence.
2. The Harmless Error Test-A More Appropriate Standard of Review?
In addition to arguing that courts should not consider evidence that the
State never presented to a jury in considering a convicted offender's motion
for a new trial under the newly discovered evidence test, 153 defense
attorneys have argued alternatively that the newly discovered evidence test
is inapplicable to the cases at issue, because this test applies only when
evidence was not presented to the jury at trial. 154 By contrast, cases
involving post-conviction DNA testing are distinguishable from other

145. Id. at 206.
146. Id. at 207.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 209.
149. Id. The State sought to offer evidence from the police who spoke to the victim after
the attack and were told by her that the "assailant complained to her that he was unable to
ejaculate during the assault." Id. The State also sought to have the reviewing court hear
testimony from the victim herself. Id.
150. Id. at 210.
151. Id. For an argument as to why courts that apply the newly discovered evidence test
should adopt the logic of the court in Reese, see infra Part III.A. 1.
152. Cf Petition for Review, supranote 65, at 28-29.
153. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
154. See State v. Armstrong, Nos. 01-2789 & 02-2979, 2004 Wisc. App. LEXIS 453, at
**21 (Wis. Ct. App. May 27, 2004), rev'don other grounds, 2005 WI 119, 700 N.W.2d 98.
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instances of newly discovered evidence in that the physical evidence was
previously presented to a jury and linked to the defendant, and the results of
post-conviction DNA testing on that evidence indicates that it did not
originate from the petitioner. 155 Furthermore, many newly discovered
156
evidence statutes have strict temporal restrictions on new trial motions,
which can prove fatal to the claims of those defendants who were convicted
long before DNA testing became forensically available. 157 Thus, defense
attorneys have argued that a new standard, one that is analogous to the
harmless error doctrine, should apply in cases in which the exculpatory
results of DNA testing prove that the trial jury was presented with false
conclusions about material trial evidence. 158 Under this doctrine, the party
who benefited from the error-which in these cases would be the Statebears the burden of proving that the error did not contribute to the guilty
59
verdict.1
3. Newly Discovered Evidence or Harmless Error: Which Test Applies?
Policy Arguments on Both Sides
Because the petitioner bears the burden of proof under the newly
discovered evidence test, it is conceptually more difficult for a petitioner to
succeed in obtaining a new trial under this test than under the harmless error
test. 160 To be sure, there are many policy reasons that support subjecting
petitioners to a stricter test for challenging their convictions. States have a
strong interest in ensuring the finality of judgments, which the U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized as essential to both the retributive and
deterrent functions of criminal law and to the interests of victims in
obtaining closure. 16 1 Moreover, the "'erosion of memory' and 'dispersion
of witnesses' that occur with the passage of time" diminish the chances of a
155. See id. at **22. Prosecutors may challenge this argument on the grounds that courts
have held that it is the results of the DNA testing to be performed on physical evidence,
rather than the physical evidence itself, which should be considered "newly discovered" for
purposes of the newly discovered evidence test. See, e.g., People v. Wise, 752 N.Y.S.2d 837,
847 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2002) (holding that the results of DNA testing performed on
semen discovered on a victim's body and on clothing found near a crime scene "is certainly
newly discovered in the traditional sense since it was not available at trial and could not have
been discovered with due diligence"); People v. Tookes, 639 N.Y.S.2d 913, 915 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1996) (defining "DNA test results as potential 'newly discovered evidence'
which may form the basis for a motion to vacate judgment").
156. See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(1) ("Any motion for a new trial grounded on newly
discovered evidence must be filed within [three] years after the verdict or finding of guilty.")
157. See Developments in the Law: Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific
Evidence, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1481, 1577 (1995) [hereinafter Confronting the Challenges].
158. See Petition for Review, supra note 65, at 12 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S 668, 694 (1984), in which the Supreme Court found constitutional error where "[t]he
result of the proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair").
159. Armstrong, 2004 Wisc. App. LEXIS 453, at **21. For an argument as to why courts
should adopt a test analogous to the harmless error doctrine in these cases, see infra part
III.A.2.
160. See, e.g., Armstrong, 2004 Wisc. App. LEXIS 453, at **22.
161. See Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 25, at 606 n.245.
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reliable criminal adjudication if a retrial is granted. 162 Further, traditional
forms of newly discovered evidence "may suggest innocence but may not
be definitive; this possibility, combined with evidence deterioration
problems, may be thought to weaken the appeal to 'innocence' enough that
it does not merit disturbing the original judgment."' 63 Such strictness may
also serve to put moral pressure on those who know of yet-undiscovered
evidence to come forward without delay. 164 Finally, strict rules create
strong incentives for defendants to perform a thorough investigation while
evidence is fresh and to introduce it as soon as practicable, rather than to
1 65
hold it back to get a new trial.
The usual concerns that arise in traditional post-conviction proceedings,
166
however, are lacking in the context of exculpatory DNA test results.
Specifically, "[w]here DNA demonstrates innocence, a central reason for
respecting finality of criminal judgments-that retrying a case years later
will yield no objectively sounder result than the initial trial-is not
implicated.' ' 16 7 Moreover, as contrasted with the potentially stale testimony
of witnesses who change their story or come forward years after trial,
exculpatory DNA test results invariably provide more accurate and reliable
fact-finding with respect to critical biological evidence 168 and not simply
grounds upon which to doubt the validity of the conviction.1 69 Thus, the
arguments for a stricter test are less compelling
in the context of
170
exculpatory post-conviction DNA test results.
At least one court has struggled with the question of which test to apply
172
in DNA-based post-conviction proceedings. 171 In State v. Armstrong,
the court noted that there was a rational distinction between newly
discovered evidence not presented to the jury and evidence later shown to
be false, and that "[a]dditional evidence is conceptually different from
evidence from which the State argued false conclusions.' ' 173 The court also
observed that, if they applied the harmless error test, it would probably
result in reversal of the trial court's denial of the petitioner's motion for a
162. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 453 (1986) (plurality opinion); see also Herrera
v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 403 (1993) (observing that "the passage of time only diminishes the
reliability of criminal adjudications"); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991) (finding
that "when a habeas petitioner succeeds in obtaining a new trial, the erosion of memory and

dispersion of witnesses that occur with the passage of time prejudice the government and
diminish the chances of a reliable criminal adjudication" (internal quotations omitted)).
163. Confronting the Challenges, supra note 157, at 1577.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 1577-78.
167. Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 25, at 596.
168. See Protecting the Innocent, supra note 29, at 226 (testimony of Barry Scheck,
Codirector, The Innocence Project).
169. Double Helix, supra note 25, at 609.
170. See Protectingthe Innocent, supra note 29, at 226.
171. See State v. Armstrong, Nos. 01-2789 & 02-2979, 2004 Wisc. App. LEXIS 453, at
**22 (Wis. Ct. App. May 27, 2004), rev'd on other grounds, 2005 WI 119, 700 N.W.2d 98.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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new trial. 174 Further, the court stated that it is "anomalous that [a court]

use[s] a more strict test where the State benefits from false factual
conclusions than where the State benefits from an erroneous evidentiary
ruling."' 75 The court nevertheless felt that it was "not free to develop a
different test," because the test for newly discovered evidence was the test
that both the highest state court and that court used. 176 Applying the newly
discovered evidence test, the court found that the petitioner failed to show
that the admission of exculpatory DNA test results created177a reasonable
probability that the outcome would be different in a new trial.
D. JudicialEstoppel
In addition to disputing who bears the burden of proof in DNA-based
post-conviction proceedings, defense attorneys have argued that courts
should judicially estop prosecutors from asserting arguments in opposition
to a petitioner's post-conviction claim of innocence which are inconsistent
with the theory of the case that the State presented at trial. 178 Although a
handful of jurisdictions theoretically allow judicial estoppel to be applied
against the government in criminal cases, 179 there is no case in which the
doctrine has been successfully invoked against a state. 180 Thus, although a
174. Id.at **21-22.
175. Id.at **22.
176. Id. at **22-23 (citing State v. Avery, 570 N.W.2d 573 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997)).
Ironically, the court's application of the newly discovered evidence test in Avery led to that
petitioner's continued wrongful incarceration for six additional years before he was
exonerated by further DNA testing. Petition for Review, supra note 65, at 4.
177. Armstrong, 2004 Wisc. App. LEXIS 453, at **29. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
reversed the decision of the circuit court in the interest of justice and remanded the case with
instructions for the lower court to vacate Armstrong's conviction and order a new trial. State
v. Armstrong, 2005 WI 119,
2, 700 N.W.2d 98, 2. The court reversed on the grounds
that post-conviction DNA testing on biological evidence linked to Armstrong at trial, which
the test results showed did not originate from Armstrong, indicated that the real controversy
at trial-the identification of the perpetrator-was not fully tried. Id. Because the court decided
this case as it did, it did not explicitly address whether the newly discovered evidence test or
the harmless error test was the appropriate standard under which courts should analyze DNA
based post-conviction motions. The court did, however, in dicta, "clarify the proper test for
analyzing newly discovered evidence," indicating that the newly discovered evidence test
remains the standard under which DNA-based claims of innocence are analyzed in
Wisconsin. Id.at 157.
178. Armstrong, 2004 Wisc. App. LEXIS 453, at **18-19.
179. See, e.g., State v. Towery, 920 P.2d 290 (Ariz. 1996).
180. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 765 N.E.2d 578, 582 (Ind. 2002) (noting that "judicial
estoppel in this state has been applied only in civil cases, and neither this Court nor the Court
of Appeals has applied the doctrine against the State in a criminal case"). Federal courts
have been even less receptive to the application of judicial estoppel against the government
in criminal proceedings. For example, in United States v. Garcia, the court found no
precedent for the use of judicial estoppel in the criminal context, noting that "[g]iven the
unique status of the government as a litigant.., and the great degree of latitude that the
government enjoys in prosecuting the law and striking plea bargains.., we are simply not
persuaded that this is a case in which to plow such novel legal ground." No. 99-10262, 2000
U.S. App. LEXIS 4178, at *4 (9th Cir. Mar. 14, 2000) (citations omitted); see also Nichols
v. Scott, 69 F.3d 1255, 1272 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that judicial estoppel is not
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few criminal cases have noted that the doctrine of judicial estoppel could
preclude the State from asserting a particular contention, in each case at
least one of the elements of judicial estoppel was not satisfied.' 8 1 The next
sections discuss the three conditions that must be satisfied in order for a
court to apply judicial estoppel against a party to a criminal proceeding, (1)
The parties must be the same in both proceedings, (2) the facts or question
at issue must be the same in both proceedings, and (3) the party asserting
the inconsistent position must have been successful in a prior judicial
82
proceeding. 1
1. The Parties Must Be the Same
Courts have held that, in civil cases, the party seeking the protection of
judicial estoppel need not have been a party to the prior proceeding in
which the alleged contradictory statement was made. 8 3 Citing these
decisions, defendants in criminal cases have requested that courts apply
judicial estoppel against the State to prevent prosecutors from attempting to
convict two defendants of the same crime in separate trials, where only one
can be truly guilty of the offense. 184 Moreover, much of the scholarship
regarding the application of judicial estoppel in the criminal context
addresses the use of the doctrine to bar prosecutors from prosecuting two
defendants for the same crime in separate trials. 185 Nevertheless, courts in
criminal cases have consistently rejected requests to apply judicial estoppel
against the State where the parties to the separate criminal proceedings in

constitutionally mandated and has never been applied against the government in a criminal
proceeding); United States v. Kattar, 840 F.2d 118, 129 n.7 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating that
judicial estoppel is an "obscure doctrine [that] has never been applied against the
government in a criminal proceeding"). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that the
Government may not be estopped on the same terms as any other litigant, because "[w]hen
the Government is unable to enforce the law because the conduct of its agents has given rise
to an estoppel, the interest of the citizenry as a whole in obedience to the rule of law is
undermined." Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford County, Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 60
(1984). As such, the Supreme Court has "reversed every finding of estoppel [against the
government] that we have reviewed." Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 422
(1990). The Court has, however, left "for another day whether an estoppel claim could ever
succeed against the Government." Id. at 423.
181. Smith, 765 N.E.2d at 582-83 (citing Brightman v. State, 758 N.E.2d 41, 47-48 (Ind.
2001)); Redington v. State, 678 N.E.2d 114, 117 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
182. See Towery, 920 P.2d at 290.
183. See, e.g., Bellinger v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank of St. Louis, 779 S.W.2d 647, 650 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1989); Travelers Prop. Cas. Corp. v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 1998 OK CIV APP
80, 3, 966 P.2d 1190, 1191; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Wells, 557 S.W.2d 144, 147 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1977).
184. See Poulin, supra note 25, at 1424 (providing the example of a prosecutor arguing in
two separate murder trials that two defendants each fired the single bullet that killed the
victim and obtaining convictions and death sentences for both defendants).
185. 1d; see also Michael Q. English, Note, A Prosecutor's Use of Inconsistent Factual
Theories of a Crime in Successive Trials: Zealous Advocacy or a Due Process Violation?,
68 Fordham L. Rev. 525, 547 (1999).
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question are not identical.186 In so holding, courts have reasoned that if,
after one defendant is convicted of a crime, additional evidence becomes
available suggesting the guilt of a second person on an inconsistent theory,
some type of relief may be afforded to the first defendant. 187 The
immunization of the second defendant due to a mistake in the prosecution
8
of the first, however, is not the appropriate remedy. 18
These same courts, however, have also left "for another day the issue of
whether judicial estoppel can be applied against the State in a criminal case
if the parties in the prior suit are the same, i.e., in a subsequent prosecution
of the same defendant."' 189 This language leaves open the possibility that
this requirement for applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel would be
satisfied in cases where convicted offenders presenting exculpatory DNA
test results in support of their claims of innocence request that courts estop
prosecutors from making arguments inconsistent with the theory of the
90
crime advanced at trial. 1
2. The Question or Facts Involved Must Be the Same
In addition to the requirement that the parties in both criminal
proceedings be identical for judicial estoppel to apply, courts also require
that the facts or question involved be the same in both proceedings. 19 1 This
requirement serves the specific goal of protecting the judicial system from
being manipulated by "chameleonic litigants" who attempt to prevail twice
on the same set of facts, but on opposite theories. 19 2 Thus, for example,
courts have found this requirement met where a plaintiff who had been
granted disability benefits on the grounds that he was totally disabled then
attempted to recover against his employer under the Americans with
Disabilities Act on the grounds that he was terminated despite being a
186. See, e.g., Smith, 765 N.E.2d at 583 (holding that judicial estoppel based on an
inconsistent position in an earlier criminal case against a different defendant did not apply
against the State).
187. Id.at 584.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See infra Part III.B. 1 for an explanation of why this prong is satisfied in the cases at
issue in this Note.
191. See State v. Towery, 920 P.2d 290, 304 (Ariz. 1996); State v. Armstrong, Nos. 012789 & 02-2979, 2004 Wisc. App. LEXIS 453, at **18-19 (Wis. Ct. App. May 27, 2004),
rev'd on other grounds, 2005 WI 119, 700 N.W.2d 98. The doctrine of judicial estoppel
applies only to prevent the presentation of inconsistent factual positions; expressions of
opinion and assertions of legal conclusions do not trigger application of the doctrine. Boyers,
supra note 85, at 1262; see also People v. Caballero, 794 N.E.2d 251, 263 (I11.
2002).
Expressions of opinions are not estopped because they "reflect the speaker's then-current
state of mind and are inherently variable." Boyers, supra note 85, at 1262. Assertions of
legal conclusions do not trigger the application of the doctrine because "historically,
switching one's legal grounds in a suit has never been regarded with the same disfavor as
maintaining inconsistent positions as to the facts." Id.(quoting Note, The Doctrine of
Preclusion Against Inconsistent Positions in JudicialProceedings, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1132,

1133 (1946)).
192. See Levinson v. United States, 969 F.2d 260, 264 (7th Cir. 1992).
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qualified person with a disability who could perform the essential functions
of his job. 193
This requirement is typically not disputed in criminal cases. For
example, in State v. Towery,194 a convicted offender requested that the court
apply the doctrine to prevent the State from presenting evidence that the
defendant had confessed to his roommate that he committed a murder,
because the State had previously used the same evidence to convict the
defendant of an unrelated armed robbery. 195 The court found that the
question from both trials was the same; namely, whether the defendant had
confessed to his roommate that he committed the crime at issue, or another,
196
unrelated crime.
The decision of one court in declining to invoke the doctrine because this
requirement was not met, however, calls into question whether the doctrine
of judicial estoppel can ever apply against the State in cases where the
convicted offender seeks to introduce exculpatory results of post-conviction
DNA testing. In State v. Armstrong,197 a convicted murderer requested that
the court invoke judicial estoppel to prevent the State from making
198
arguments that were inconsistent with that which the State argued at trial.
Specifically, the State argued at trial that two hairs found on the victim's
bathrobe belt, which the murderer left draped on top of the victim's naked
body, originated from the perpetrator and specifically implicated
Armstrong. 19 9 When the results of post-conviction DNA testing excluded
Armstrong as the source of the hairs,200 however, the State reversed course
and argued that the biological evidence from the crime scene was not
connected to the murder and that "innocuous reasons explain why that
'20 1
physical evidence was present."

193. See, e.g., McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 617-18 (3d Cir. 1996).
194. 920 P.2d at 290.
195. Id. at 304-05.

196. Id. In Towery, both the first and the second requirements for the application of
judicial estoppel were met; however, the court declined to invoke judicial estoppel in this
case because the third requirement for the application of judicial estoppel was not satisfied.
Id. at 305-06. See infra notes 256-58 and accompanying text for the court's reasons as to
why the third requirement was not met in Towery.
197. Nos. 01-2789 & 02-2979, 2004 Wisc. App. LEXIS 453 (Wis. Ct. App. May 27,
2004), rev'don other grounds, 2005 WI 119, 700 N.W.2d 98.
198. Id. at **18-19.

199. Id. at **18; see also Petition for Review, supra note 65, at 6. At trial, a microscopic
hair analyst testified that one of the two hairs was consistent and that the other was similar to
Armstrong's hair. Armstrong, 2004 Wisc. App. LEXIS 453 at **13.

Moreover, the

prosecutor emphasized this hair evidence in closing arguments to the jury, stating that "[t]he
physical evidence.., ties (Armstrong] irrevocably to the murder of' the victim. See Petition
for Review, supra note 65, at 7 (quoting Transcript of Record at 131, State v. Armstrong,
2005 WI 119, 700 N.W.2d 98 (Nos. 01-2789 & 02-2979)).

200. Furthermore, the DNA test results demonstrated that the hairs on the bathrobe belt
came from the same person, and this person was neither the victim, nor Armstrong, nor the
victim's boyfriend. Petition for Review, supra note 65, at 7.
201. Armstrong, 2004 Wisc. App. LEXIS 453 at **18.
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Without reaching the question of whether the State was advancing a truly
inconsistent position from trial, 20 2 the court held that judicial estoppel did
not lie because Armstrong sought to present newly discovered evidencenamely, the exculpatory DNA test results-and thus the facts were not the
same in both proceedings. 20 3 On appeal of this decision, however,
Armstrong contended that the facts in both proceedings were indeed the
same-"that hair belonging to someone other than the victim was found on
the bloodied bathrobe belt laying on top of her dead body" 2 04-and that it is
only the conclusion that the State was drawing from those facts that was
205
different.
3. The Party Asserting the Inconsistent Position Must Have Been
Successful in the Prior Judicial Proceeding
Even if the parties and the facts or questions involved are the same in
both proceedings, courts will refuse to apply judicial estoppel unless the
party asserting the inconsistent position was successful in the prior judicial
proceeding. 20 6 This condition requires two elements be met: First, the
party to be estopped must be advancing an inconsistent position; 20 7 and
second, the party to be estopped must have been successful in the first
proceeding as a result of the position taken therein, which the party is now
20 8
contradicting in the subsequent proceeding.
a. InconsistentPositions
Courts justify invoking the doctrine of judicial estoppel on the theory that
"[a] party who has gained an advantage by characterizing the law or facts
involved in a case should not later be able to contradict that characterization
in order to obtain a further advantage." 20 9 Thus, "[a] party can argue

202. See infra Part II.B.3.a for a review of the different approaches courts take in
determining whether an argument asserted by the State in post-conviction proceedings is
inconsistent with the theory of the crime presented by the State at trial.
203. Armstrong, 2004 Wisc. App. LEXIS 453 at **19. For an argument as to why this

prong of the test is satisfied in cases involving exculpatory post-conviction DNA test results,
see infra Part III.B.l.
204. Petition for Review, supra note 65, at 28.

205. Id. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the court's decision and remanded the
case for a new trial, but on different grounds. State v. Armstrong, 2005 WI 119, 700 N.W.2d
98.

Specifically, the Court held that results of the post-conviction DNA testing which

excluded Armstrong as the source of biological evidence previously linked to him at trial
rendered the controversy of identification of the perpetrator not fully tried. Id. at 2; see also
supra note 177.

The Supreme Court did not discuss whether the application of judicial

estoppel was appropriate in this case, leaving the resolution of this issue-at least in
Wisconsin-for another day. Armstrong, 2005 WI 119, 109, 700 N.W.2d 98,
206. State v. Towery, 920 P.2d 290, 304-05 (Ariz. 1996).
207. See Boyers, supra note 85, at 1263-64.

208. Towery, 920 P.2d at 305.
209. United States v. Kepner, 843 F.2d 755, 760 (3d Cir. 1988).

109.
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inconsistent positions in the alternative, 2 10 but once it has sold one to the
court it cannot turn around and repudiate it in order to have a second
victory." 2 1 1 For example, a court once invoked judicial estoppel to bar a
criminal defendant who requested a lesser-included charge of manslaughter
at trial from arguing on appeal2 12that the evidence was insufficient to support
his conviction on that charge.
Courts apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel only when the positions
taken by a party in separate proceedings are truly inconsistent; 2 13 that is,
when "'the truth of one ... necessarily preclude[s] the truth of [the]
other."' 2 14 For example, in People v. Gayfield2 15 the court held that
prosecutors did not take inconsistent positions in two proceedings where, in
the first proceeding, a defendant pleaded guilty to murder and identified one
man as the shooter and, in the second proceeding, the state prosecuted the
petitioner with the murder and identified him as the shooter. 2 16 Without
discussing whether judicial estoppel should apply in a criminal proceeding,
the court rejected applying the doctrine on the facts of the case, concluding
that "there was no certain position taken at one proceeding that was
2 17
contrary to another proceeding."
In one of the few cases where a court invoked judicial estoppel against
the Government, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Russell

210. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2) ("A party may set forth two or more statements of a
claim or defense alternately .... A party may also state as many separate claims or defenses
as the party has regardless of consistency .... "). Scholars have suggested that issues of
inconsistency that arise within a single trial do not threaten the basic fairness of the process
because when the prosecution offers the jury alternate bases upon which the jury could
resolve the case, the jury can evaluate and weigh inconsistent alternatives in the context of
the entire case. Poulin, supra note 25, at 1429-30. This is true even if the prosecution argues
truly irreconcilable positions, such as arguing in a single trial that each of two defendants
fired the single fatal bullet, because the jury can evaluate them as alternatives with the
knowledge that both cannot be true. Id. at 1429.
211. Cont'l Ill. Corp. v. Comm'r, 998 F.2d 513, 518 (7th Cir. 1993).
212. State v. Michels, 414 N.W.2d 311, 317 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
213. State v. Petty, 548 N.W.2d 817, 821 n.5 (Wis. 1996).
214. Boyers, supra note 85, at 1263 (quoting Dept. of Transp. v. Coe, 445 N.E.2d 506,
508-10 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)).
215. 633 N.E.2d 919 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
216. Id. at 924-25. The specific facts of this case are as follows: Latero Jones pled guilty
to the 1988 murder of Eric Rodgers. Id. at 923. At a dispositional hearing for the guilty plea,
it was stipulated on the record between the State and Jones that Richard Cooks was the
murderer, and Jones was pleading guilty because he had assisted Cooks in murdering
Rodgers by identifying Rodgers to Cooks. Id. at 923-24. The State subsequently prosecuted
Gayfield for this murder. Id. at 924. Gayfield contended the State should be estopped from
prosecuting him for this inurder because at Jones's dispositional hearing the State advanced
the theory that another person was the perpetrator. Id. at 923. The court rejected Gayfield's
estoppel argument, finding that the State's theory in Jones's dispositional hearing was that
Jones was accountable for the murder, not that Cooks was the perpetrator. Id. at 924-25.
217. Id. at 925. The court noted that "[t]he only relevancy of naming Cooks is that it
supported Jones' confession that he acted in concert with another in accomplishing the
murder. To be certain, Jones could have named anyone as the shooter." Id at 924; accord
Commonwealth v. Lam, 684 A.2d 153, 164 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
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v. ROlfS2 18 estopped the State from advancing contradictory and "flatly

2 19
inconsistent" positions in successive post-conviction proceedings.
During a federal habeas corpus proceeding, the prosecution argued to the
district court that the petitioner had failed to exhaust all available state
remedies; thus, federal review of his conviction was improper because the
petitioner had an adequate and available remedy in state court through the
Personal Restraint Petition procedure. 220 The petitioner subsequently filed
for relief in state court, before which the prosecution "disregarded its
previous representation in federal court" and instead argued that the
petitioner's petition "should be dismissed because this petition [sic] raises
the same legal basis for granting relief as did his appeal, the issues were
decided on the merits against [the petitioner], and now considering these
same issues in his personal restraint petition would not serve the ends of
justice." 22 1 The court estopped the prosecution from making these
contradictory arguments, holding that "[h]aving persuaded the district court
to deny appellant federal review on the ground that he had an 'adequate and
available' state remedy, the state cannot now be permitted to oppose
appellant's petition for relief on the theory he was actually procedurally

barred in state court.

'2 22

In the DNA context, prosecutors assert that they are not advancing
irreconcilably inconsistent positions when they argue that the biological
evidence, previously linked to the defendant, is irrelevant to the convicted
offender's guilt. 223 Prosecutors also argue that they are not advancing an
inconsistent position from trial when they argue a new theory of the crime,
because the State's theory of the case at trial was and always has been that
the person convicted of the crime was the perpetrator. 2 24 Petitioners,
however, can look to the decision of one court for support that courts
should reject arguments made by prosecutors to explain how someone is
guilty of a crime despite the fact that the results of post-conviction DNA
testing demonstrate that the petitioner is not the source of the biological
225
evidence left by the perpetrator and linked at trial to the petitioner.

218. 893 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1990).
219. Id. at 1037-39.
220. Id. at 1037.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1038.
223. See, e.g., State v. Armstrong, Nos. 01-2789 & 02-2979, 2004 Wisc. App. LEXIS
453, at **18 (Wis. Ct. App. May 27, 2004), rev'd on other grounds, 2005 WI 119, 700
N.W.2d 98.
224. See, e.g., Watkins v. Miller, 92 F. Supp. 2d 824, 840 n.9 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (discussing

the State's contention that its theory of the case at trial espoused no particular view
concerning whether Watkins acted alone, or in concert with someone else, simply that he
was involved with her death); Armstrong, 2004 Wisc. App. LEXIS 453 at * * 18 (discussing

the State's argument that judicial estoppel could not be invoked against the State because it
had not asserted irreconcilably inconsistent positions, in that it has consistently taken the

position that Armstrong sexually assaulted and murdered the victim).
225. See Watkins, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 824.
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Jerry Watkins, who was convicted in 1986 of the rape and murder of his
eleven-year-old sister-in-law, 226 moved for habeas corpus relief in federal
district court on the basis of post-conviction DNA test results which showed
that he was not the source of the semen found in the victim. 22 7 In
opposition to Watkins's motion for habeas relief, the State theorized that
Watkins and another person raped the victim, 228 even though at trial the
State never suggested that anyone other than Watkins raped and murdered
the victim. 229 The district court rejected this argument, because it was not
only "farfetched" from a scientific standpoint, as it depended on "the
improbable assumption that semen from two different men just happened to
be collected on the same vaginal swab in exactly equal amounts," 230 but
with the theory of the case the prosecution
also "utterly inconsistent"
231
presented to the jury.
In the alternative, the State argued that, because Watkins was convicted
of murder rather than rape, evidence that he is innocent of rape would not
show he is actually innocent of murder. 232 As the court pointed out,
however, at trial the prosecution never suggested nor hinted at the
2 33
possibility that one person raped the victim and another murdered her.
Indeed, at trial the State contended that one person-Watkins--committed
both crimes. 234 Furthermore, the State used evidence linking the rape to the
murder to persuade the trial court to admit damaging evidence against
Watkins. 235 The court rejected this new theory as well, finding that, "[b]y
226. Id. at 827.
227. See id. at 827, 836.
228. Id. at 836.
229. Id. at 838.
230. Id. at 828. The forensic scientist who performed the DNA testing testified that
because the DQ Alpha test results on the sperm from the victim's vaginal swab were 1.1/4,
he could not completely exclude the possibility that Watkins was a source because his DQ
Alpha genotype is 4/4, and some of the material on the vaginal swab tested as 4. Id. at 83637. The forensic scientist explained that the 1.1 portion and the 4 portion of the male
material on the swab were of equal intensity, and that one theoretical explanation for this DQ
Alpha test result is that the male portion of the swab material could have come from a man
like Watkins with 4/4 DQ Alpha, which was mixed with an equal amount of material from
another man with 1.1/1.1 DQ Alpha. Id. at 836. However, the forensic scientist testified that
this possibility of an equal mixture of 1.1/1.1 and 4/4 from two men was "farfetched" from a
scientific standpoint. Id. at 837. To get such a result from two men, they each would have to
have deposited semen that mixed in such a way that the swab collected equal amounts of
sperm from each. Id. at 836-37. Thus, the forensic scientist testified, the "most reasonable"
and "more logical easiest interpretation" of the 1.1/4 results is that the sperm came from one
man with the 1.1/4 genotype-a DQ Alpha profile that did not match Watkins. Id. at 836.
231. Id. at 828. As the district court pointed out, at no point during Watkins's trial did the
State suggest that the victim was raped and murdered by anyone other than Watkins. See id.
at 838.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 839.
234. Id.
235. Id. The trial court admitted evidence that Watkins had molested both the victim and
her older sister prior to the victim's rape and murder to support the State's theory that
Watkins showed a "depraved sexual instinct." Id. That evidence was admitted as relevant
only because, according to the State, there was also evidence that the victim had been raped
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arguing to this court that the murder and the rape were not necessarily
linked, the state has [again] abandoned the foundation of both the case it
persuaded the trial judge to allow and the case it persuaded the jury to credit
beyond a reasonable doubt. '2 36 The court granted Watkins's writ of habeas
corpus and vacated his conviction partly 237 because "[t]he state's theory
that Watkins alone raped [the victim] and then killed her-the only theory
argued to the jury-is excluded by the DNA evidence beyond any
reasonable doubt. '238 The court also noted that "no one should be
sentenced to 60 days in prison, let alone 60 years, on the theory and
evidence the state relies upon in this case to keep Jerry Watkins in
239
prison."
The court's rejection of the State's inconsistent arguments in Watkins did
not manifest as an application of judicial estoppel against the State.
Nevertheless, the logic of the court's decision could be used by petitioners
facing the same type of arguments in their DNA-based post-conviction
proceedings to support their contention that the State is advancing a
position truly inconsistent with that which it advanced at trial.
b. Success in a PriorProceeding
Courts require success in a prior judicial proceeding in order to apply
judicial estoppel because, absent judicial acceptance of the prior position,
there is no risk of inconsistent results. 240 The "success" test narrows the
scope of judicial estoppel, allowing courts to protect themselves from
specific threats to their integrity while simultaneously ensuring that the
24 1
doctrine is not overused to the detriment of litigants.
Some courts have held that a prior position was successfully maintained
only if the party gained judicial relief as a result of asserting the particular
position in the first proceeding. 242 However, most courts that have

by Watkins. See Watkins v. State, 528 N.E.2d 456, 458 (Ind. 1988) (upholding on direct
appeal the admission of evidence at trial that the defendant had previously molested the
victim's older sister to support the State's theory that the defendant had a "depraved sexual
instinct").
236. Watkins, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 839.
237. The court also granted the writ of habeas corpus because the State had withheld
potentially exculpatory, non-DNA evidence from Watkins at the time of trial, which is a
constitutional violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Watkins, 92 F. Supp.
2d at 856-57.
238. Watkins, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 839.
239. Id.at 840.
240. State v. Towery, 920 P.2d 290, 305 (Ariz. 1996).
241. Deeks, supra note 81, at 877; see also Boyers, supra note 85, at 1263 (stating that
"the court, keeping in mind the 'unnecessary hardship' that may result from invoking
judicial estoppel when the position was unimportant in the initial proceeding, determines
whether the importance of the issue in the particular case justifies invocation of the

doctrine").
242. See Towery, 920 P.2d at 305 (citing Standage Ventures, Inc. v. State, 562 P.2d 360
(Ariz. 1977); State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Civil Serv. Employees Ins. Co., 509 P.2d 725, 731
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considered this issue have held that the prior court's acceptance of the
position now contradicted is sufficient to constitute prior success. 24 3 For
example, consider the following: An employee files a claim under a state
worker's compensation statute, and his assertion at the hearing of ten
percent disability is stipulated for the record. 244 Although the employee is
ultimately denied compensation on the grounds that the injury did not arise
"out of and in the course of employment" as required by the relevant
statute, there was nevertheless judicial acceptance of his claim to a ten
percent disability as evidenced by the stipulation on the record. 245 Suppose
further that the employee subsequently sues his employer under tort law and
claims thirty percent disability. 24 6 Under the prior success rule, the
employee would be estopped from claiming thirty percent disability,
because his previous assertion of a ten percent disability was accepted in the
2 47
prior judicial proceeding.
In the criminal context, however, it is difficult-if not impossible-to
determine whether a prior court accepted the State's particular assertion,
which prosecutors later contradict in the face of exculpatory DNA test
results, because juries rarely, if ever, articulate the basis for their
verdicts. 248 Thus, it has been established that, in determining whether the
prior success test for the application of judicial estoppel is met, courts in
criminal cases must examine the record of the trial to determine whether the
assertion at issue was arguably significant to the jury's determination of the
defendant's guilt.249 In other words, the relevant inquiry in criminal cases
is whether the court concludes that the judicial relief obtained by the State
in the form of a conviction was arguably due, at least in part, to the
assertion that the prosecution is now contradicting.2 5 0 Furthermore,
because it is difficult, or even impossible, to ascertain the basis for the
jury's verdict, it has been suggested that "[t]he prosecution [may] be able to
avoid the impact of the doctrine only by demonstrating that the inconsistent
' 25 1
theory was specifically rejected by the court or the jury in the first trial."

(Ariz. Ct. App. 1973); Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 893 P.2d 39, 44 (Ariz. Ct.

App. 1995)).
243. See Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 936 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting that
judicial estoppel does not require a prior litigation of the issue in question, "merely a prior
judicial acceptance of the factual assertion made by the party who now advances an
inconsistent contention"); Towery, 920 P.2d at 305 (citing Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
690 F.2d 595, 598 (6th Cir. 1982)); see also Boyers, supranote 85, at 1256.
244. See Boyers, supranote 85, at 1256-57.
245. Id. at 1257.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Poulin, supra note 25, at 1454; see also, e.g., United States v. Quintero, 165 F.3d
831, 836 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding that inconsistency of verdicts does not provide
information about a jury's reasoning); United States v. Vaughn, 80 F.3d 549, 551 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (listing possible bases for a jury verdict), cited in Poulin, supra note 25, 1444 n. 122.
249. State v. Towery, 920 P.2d 290, 305 (Ariz. 1996).
250. See id
251. Poulin, supra note 25, at 1455.
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Thus, judicial estoppel is generally not applied when the trial record
indicates that the first inconsistent position was not a significant factor in
the initial proceeding. 2 52 For example, in State v. Towery, 253 the defendant
requested that the court estop the prosecutor from allowing the defendant's
roommate to testify that the defendant confessed to murder, when the State
had previously used the roommate's testimony describing the same
confession to convict the defendant of an unrelated armed robbery. 254 The
defendant argued that by presenting evidence of a single incident at two
separate trials to prove two separate, unrelated crimes, the prosecutor was
making inconsistent use of the same
evidence, an action which warranted
255
the application of judicial estoppel.
Despite the State's concession that the roommate heard only one
admission about one crime, while using the same admission in two trials to
prove two unrelated criminal acts, the Arizona Supreme Court nevertheless
held that judicial estoppel did not apply. 256 The court held this because a
review of the trial record indicated that the roommate's testimony at the
robbery trial constituted an insignificant factor in obtaining a conviction in
that trial. 257 Thus, the State's prior position that the defendant confessed to
his roommate that he had committed a robbery had not been successfully
maintained. 2 58 Similarly, prosecutors faced with exculpatory postconviction DNA test results argue that biological evidence linked to the
convicted offender at trial was insignificant to the verdict, in light of other
25 9
evidence of guilt.
252. Boyers, supra note 85, at 1263.
253. 920 P.2d at 290.
254. Id. at 304-06.
255. Id. at 303-04.
256. Id. at 306.
257. Id. The court cited numerous other pieces of evidence from the trial record that
indicated that the roommate's testimony was insignificant to the finding of guilt in the armed
robbery trial, including: (1) There had been identification of the defendant in a photographic
line-up and at trial by all of the robbery victims; (2) when the defendant was arrested for the
armed robbery, he had four credit cards of one of the victims in his wallet; (3) the police
found a gun in the defendant's home identified by one of the victims as the gun used in the
robbery, as well as clothing similar to that worn by the perpetrator of the robbery; (4) the
defendant had a police scanner on his person when arrested, and the robbery victims had
noted that the robber had an identical police scanner with him at the time of the crime; and
(5) the license plate of the car the defendant drove to the robbery matched that of another
roommate's car, and the roommate testified that the defendant had access to that car. Id.
Regarding the admission specifically, the court noted that the roommate's testimony about
the defendant's admission consisted of an unresponsive answer to a single question, was
never mentioned again in the examination of the roommate or any other witness, and was
never referred to in the State's opening statement or closing argument. Id. Furthermore, the
court held that a guilty verdict did not establish per se that the State's prior position
regarding the confession had been successfully maintained; it established only that the jury
accepted the State's position that petitioner committed the crime for which he was charged.
Id. at 305.
258. Id. at 306.
259. See State v. Armstrong, 2005 WI 119, 146, 700 N.W.2d 98, 146. In Armstrong,
post-conviction DNA testing excluded the person convicted of a rape and murder as the
source of biological evidence linked to him at trial. Id. at
92, 96. In opposition to
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By contrast, petitioners argue that the presentation at trial of physical
evidence as affirmative proof of guilt, later shown through DNA testing to
be erroneous, clouded an issue central to the verdict. 260 Some courts
agree. 26 1 For example, the court in Watkins v. Miller2 62 viewed specific
forensic evidence presented by the State at Watkins's murder trial as
extremely relevant to the jury's guilty verdict.2 63 At the 1986 trial, which
occurred before DNA testing was forensically available, the State
introduced evidence of blood types from serology testing, which showed
that the victim was blood type A and that Watkins was blood type 0.264
The vaginal swabs of semen taken during the autopsy, however, tested
positive for blood type B, which would be consistent with blood
types B or
265
AB, but was not consistent with the defendant's blood type.
At trial, the State offered evidence to explain how these results were
possible, even though Watkins was guilty of the crime. 266 The State's
expert witness testified that the evidence of blood type B indicators in the
semen was "very spurious" and "erratic," 267 and thus "we couldn't really
268
eliminate a blood type of any particular type for the semen donor .... "
The expert also testified that, although the evidence of type B blood could
have resulted from a perpetrator having B or AB blood, it could also have
resulted from bacterial contamination occurring in the days before the
victim's body was discovered. 2 69 The State argued to the jury that, due to
possibility of bacterial contamination, the blood tests could not eliminate
any male, including Watkins, as the source of the semen. 270 On the basis of
this evidence and the testimony of a jailhouse informant who claimed that
Watkins confessed to him, Watkins was convicted. 27 1 The results of postconviction DNA testing, however, demonstrated that Watkins was not the
Armstrong's motion for a new trial on the basis of the exculpatory DNA test results, the

State argued that it had "simply use[d] the physical evidence to establish an inference of
guilt" at trial. Id. at
139. See also text accompanying supra notes 114-22 for other
examples of cases in which prosecutors made such arguments and supra notes 41-42 for the
problems associated with other evidence of guilt, such as eyewitness identifications and

confessions.
260. See Armstrong, 700 N.W.2d at 115.
261. See, e.g., id. at 154. (holding that, based on a review of the record, it could "not be
said with any degree of certainty that the physical evidence did not influence the jury's
verdict").
262. 92 F. Supp. 2d 824 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
263. See id. at 838-39.
264. Id. at 835.
265. Id.
266. See id.
267. Id. (citing the Transcript of Record at 996, Watkins, 92 F. Supp. 2d 824 (No. IP97-

0485-C-H/G)).

268. Id. (citing the Transcript of Record at 997-98, Watkins, 92 F. Supp. 2d 824 (No.

IP97-0485-C-H/G)).

269. Id. (citing the Transcript of Record at 996-97, Watkins, 92 F. Supp. 2d 824 (No.

IP97-0485-C-H/G)).

270. Id. (citing the Transcript of Record at 2227-28, 2234, Watkins, 92 F. Supp. 2d 824

(No. IP97-0485-C-H/G)).
271. See id.
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source of the semen found in the victim's body, and conclusively disproved
the "bacterial contamination" theory the State presented at trial. 272 Partially
on the basis of these test results, the district court granted Watkins's petition
2 73
for a writ of habeas corpus.
The court's decision in this case indicates that, had the jury not accepted
the state's "bacterial contamination" explanation, the jury also could not
have credited the testimony of the jailhouse informant, who claimed that
Watkins confessed to the informant that he-and only he-murdered the
victim. 274 Nor would the jury have believed the prosecution's assertion that
"'[t]here is no evidence whatsoever that anybody else ever molested' the
victim. 275 Thus, the court considered the State's trial theory of "bacterial
contamination" of the biological evidence successful in the prior
276
proceeding.
c. Are Convicted Offenders Who Confessed or PleadGuilty but Claim They
Are Innocent Subject to JudicialEstoppel? A Related Issue.
If courts invoke the doctrine of judicial estoppel to bar prosecutors from
making arguments in post-conviction proceedings which are inconsistent
with their strategies from trial, the doctrine of judicial estoppel could also
be used to bar a convicted offender from requesting post-conviction DNA
testing if he or she confessed or pled guilty to committing the crime for
which he or she was convicted. DNA-based post-conviction claims of
innocence by definition involve a claim that the prisoner is actually
innocent, 2 77 and, at least superficially, confessing or pleading guilty seems
inconsistent with a subsequent claim of innocence. 2 78 Prosecutors may
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id. at 837-38.
Id. at 857.
Id. at 838.
Id. (quoting the Transcript of Record at 2177, Watkins, 92 F. Supp. 2d 824 (No.

IP97-0485-C-H/G)).
276. See id. at 839.
277. See Goldberg & Siegel, supra note 24, at 405.
278. Proponents of this contention may find support for their views in the many state
post-conviction DNA testing statutes which either explicitly or implicitly prohibit those who
plead guilty from requesting, and thus obtaining, post-conviction DNA testing. See, e.g.,
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4240(C)(1)(a) (2002) (referring to "verdict"); Ark. Code Ann. §
16-112-125(b)(1) (2001) (requiring petitioner to present prima facie proof that, inter alia,
"identity was an issue in the trial"); Del. Code Ann, tit. 11, § 4504(a)(3) (2001) (same); Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 925.11 (1)(a) (West 2001) (referring to "a person who has been tried and found
guilty"); Idaho Code Ann. § 19-4902(c)(1) (2002) (requiring petitioner to present prima facie
proof that, inter alia, "identity was an issue in the trial"); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/116-3(b)(1)
(2002) (same); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 926.1(B)(1) (2002) (referring to evidence
"introduced at trial"); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 2138(4)(E) (2001) (requiring petitioner
to present prima facie proof that, inter alia, "identity of the person ... was at issue during the
person's trial"); Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 8-201(c)(4) (West 2001) (same); Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 770.16(3)(b)(iii) (West 2002) (same); Minn. Stat. § 590.01(la)(2)(b)(1)
(2002) (same); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 547.035(4) (2002) (same); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A32a(a)(1)(a) (West 2002) (requiring petitioner to explain, inter alia, "why the identity of the
defendant was a significant issue in the case"); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-1A-I(C)(3)
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assert that those convicted offenders who confessed or pled guilty should be
2 79
estopped from claiming that they are innocent.
There are two critiques of this argument. First, because the petitioner
was convicted of a crime, it is difficult to say that a petitioner who
confessed or pled guilty was successful in a prior proceeding. 2 80 Thus, a
key element for the application of judicial estoppel is not met. 28 1 Second, it
is questionable whether the position that one is actually innocent is truly
inconsistent with confessing or pleading guilty. The accounts of DNA
exonerees who were originally convicted on the basis of their false
confessions demonstrate that there are many reasons why people confess to
a crime they did not commit that have nothing to do with actually being
guilty. 2 82 Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that individuals
plead guilty for a multitude of reasons other than that they are actually
2 83
culpable, and that this is constitutionally permissible.
Furthermore, courts are reluctant to invoke the doctrine of judicial
estoppel to bar defendants who pled guilty or took some strategic action
seemingly inconsistent with a claim of actual innocence from pursuing
innocence-based post-conviction relief.284 For example, in Morris v.
(LexisNexis 2001) (requiring petitioner to present prima facie proof that, inter alia, "identity
was an issue in the initial trial"); Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-301(2)(c) (2001) (requiring
petitioner to assert, inter alia, a "theory of defense, not inconsistent with theories previously
asserted at trial"); Kathy Swedlow, Don't Believe Everything You Read: A Review of
Modern "Post-Conviction" DNA Testing Statutes, 38 Cal. W. L. Rev. 355, 358 n.12 (2002).
For an analysis of the arguments in favor of amending state statutes to provide for postconviction DNA testing to prisoners who pled guilty, see Daina Borteck, Note, Pleasfor
DNA Testing: Why Lawmakers Should Amend State Post-Conviction DNA Testing Statutes
to Apply to Prisoners Who Pled Guilty, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 1429 (2004).
279. Cf Goldberg & Siegel, supra note 24, at 405.
280. While success in a prior proceeding is certainly lacking in cases where a petitioner
confessed and was convicted, a prosecutor could argue that by pleading guilty, a petitioner
"successfully" avoided a potentially longer sentence that he would have faced had he been
convicted after a trial.
281. See Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (observing that
"success in the prior proceeding is clearly an essential element of judicial estoppel").
282. See supra note 42.
283. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (holding that an individual accused
of a crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a
prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts
constituting the crime for a number of reasons, including the avoidance of the death penalty).
In Alford, the Court observed that state courts had long recognized that there are "[r]easons
other than the fact that he is guilty [which] may induce a defendant to so plead .... He must
be permitted to judge for himself in this respect." Id. at 33 (citations omitted); see also, e.g.,
United States v. Von, 535 U.S. 55, 69 n.8 (2002) (observing that the Alford theory permits a
defendant to plead guilty simply to avoid the expenses or unpredictable nature of trial).
284. See, e.g., Mozingo v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, No. C042193, 2003
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5308, at *13 (Ct. App. May 30, 2003) (holding that a petitioner
who previously claimed ineffective assistance of counsel on the grounds that his trial counsel
failed to investigate a diminished capacity defense is not taking a totally inconsistent
position when he pursues innocence-based post-conviction relief; thus, he is not estopped
from pursuing innocence-based post-conviction relief on such grounds); cf Godschalk v.
Montgomery County Dist. Attorney's Office, 177 F. Supp. 2d 366, 369-70 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
(finding a right to post-conviction DNA testing despite the defendant's "confession").
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California,28 5 the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's application of
judicial estoppel against a petitioner in a habeas corpus proceeding, which
allowed the petitioner to assert that she testified falsely at trial on the advice
286
of her attorney in support of her ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
In its holding, the court observed the following:
No circuit has ever applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel to bar a
criminal defendant from asserting a claim based on innocence, either on
direct appeal or on habeas corpus, and we will not do so now .... Justice
would not be served by holding the defendant to her prior false
statements, because to do so would assign a higher value to the "sanctity
of the oath" than to the guilt or innocence of the accused .... The judicial
process can more easily survive a rule that precludes the use of judicial
estoppel to keep intact convictions of innocent persons than it can a rule
that purports to preserve judicial sacrosanctity by leaving wrongful
convictions in place ....

We hold that the doctrine of judicial estoppel

may not be invoked where its use would serve to keep a287conviction in
effect regardless of the innocence or guilt of the defendant.
Thus, for the aforementioned reasons, it is unlikely that courts will bar
convicted offenders who confessed or pled guilty from pursuing innocence288
based post-conviction relief on the basis of exculpatory DNA test results.
III. COURTS SHOULD STOP PROSECUTORS FROM CHANGING THEIR

STORIES FROM TRIAL TO PROTECT THE INTEGRITY OF THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM

Part III demonstrates two ways in which courts can and should prevent
the State from changing its story from trial when the results of postconviction DNA testing exclude the person convicted of a crime as the
source of critical biological evidence from the crime scene.
A. Standardof Review
Courts that continue to analyze DNA-based post-conviction claims of
innocence under the newly discovered evidence test should follow the logic
of the court in Commonwealth v. Reese, 289 and prohibit prosecutors from
introducing a theory of the crime not introduced to the jury at trial. In the
alternative, courts should consider adopting a new test, analogous to the
harmless error test, to analyze DNA-based post-conviction claims of
innocence.

285. 966 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1992).
286. Id. at 452-54.
287. Id. at 453.
288. See text accompanying infra notes 306-09 for arguments as to why courts should not
invoke judicial estoppel to bar post-conviction claims of innocence of those convicted
offenders who confessed or pled guilty.
289. 663 A.2d 206 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
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1. The Appropriate Analysis Under the Newly Discovered Evidence Test
Precludes the Admission of Any State Evidence Which Was Not Introduced
at Trial
First, courts that continue to analyze DNA-based post-conviction claims
of innocence under the newly discovered evidence standard should adopt
the logic of the court in Commonwealth v. Reese,290 and refuse to hear
evidence that was not presented to and heard by the jury at the original trial
in determining whether the DNA evidence would have affected the trial had
it been introduced. 29 1 Allowing the State to argue alternate explanations of
the crime to rebut a petitioner's contention that the DNA evidence would
have changed the result if admitted at trial is tantamount to conceding that
the DNA test results undermine the verdict reached at trial. 292 Thus,
petitioners have, effectively, met their burden for granting the petitioner's
motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence.
2. Courts Should Adopt the Harmless Error Test as the Standard of Review
for DNA-Based Post-conviction Claims of Innocence
However, cases in which critical biological evidence was previously
introduced at trial and linked to the defendant through conventional
serology testing are distinguishable from traditional cases involving newly
discovered evidence, evidence which by definition was not and could not
have been introduced at trial. 293 For this reason, the results of DNA testing
are more appropriately characterized as proof which shows that the jury was
presented with erroneous evidence at trial. 294 As such, courts should adopt
a new standard of review that analyzes the impact that the erroneous
evidence had on the jury verdict. Specifically, courts should adopt a test
analogous to the harmless error test as the standard of review for postconviction motions for relief based on new DNA evidence that
demonstrates that the convicted offender was not the source of critical
biological evidence previously linked to him or her at trial.2 95 Harmless
error is a more appropriate standard under which to analyze these particular
claims because the results of post-conviction DNA testing demonstrate that
the jury was presented with erroneous evidence at trial. 296 Furthermore,
because the concerns that arise with respect to traditional forms of newly
discovered evidence 297 are not implicated in the context of post-conviction
DNA testing, it would be fundamentally unfair to impose a test with such

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

Id.
1d. at 209-10.
See Petition for Review, supra note 65, at 29-30.
See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
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strict time limits on petitioners who
have such compelling and
2 98
incontrovertible evidence of innocence.
Under the harmless error test, the State would bear the burden of proving
that the admission of evidence at trial that linked the convicted offender to
biological materials from the crime scene was "harmless" and did not
significantly contribute to the jury's guilty verdict. 299 Applying the
harmless error test in these proceedings would naturally compel prosecutors
to explain how the exculpatory post-conviction DNA results comport with
the theory of the crime presented at trial. If the State cannot meet this
burden, a new trial should be granted, in which the State can present their
new factual scenario to the appropriate fact finder-a jury.
B. JudicialEstoppel
Courts should invoke the doctrine of judicial estoppel against the State in
cases where the results of post-conviction DNA testing so undermine the
theory upon which a defendant was convicted that the only way for the
State to justify the maintenance of the conviction is to create a radically
new theory of the crime. The application of the doctrine against the State in
these situations is appropriate for two reasons: (1) The three conditions
required for the application of the doctrine in criminal cases are satisfied,
and (2) the application of judicial estoppel in these cases would advance the
policy goals of the doctrine.
1. The Three Conditions Required to Apply Judicial Estoppel in Criminal
Proceedings Are Met
The three conditions set forth by courts for the application of judicial
estoppel in criminal proceedings are met in these cases. In these
proceedings, the parties are without question the same. 300 The facts are also
the same; namely, that biological evidence originating from someone other
than the victim was found on or near the victim. 30 1 Similarly, the question
involved is the same-whether the convicted offender is the actual
perpetrator of the crime.
The third, and perhaps most crucial, condition required for the
application of judicial estoppel-that the State is advancing a position
inconsistent with the position it successfully maintained at trial-is also
satisfied. An argument is truly inconsistent with an assertion maintained at
trial when "'the truth of one.., necessarily preclude[s] the truth of [the]
other.' 302 Under this standard, it is clear that offering the new theory of an
"unindicted co-ejaculator" or some other unknown accomplice in post298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
508-10

See supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
See Petition for Review, supra note 65, at 28.
Boyers, supra note 85, at 1263 (quoting Dep't of Transp. v. Coe, 445 N.E.2d 506,
(Il1.App. Ct. 1983)).
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conviction proceedings, as prosecutors did in the cases of Earl Washington
and Jerry Watkins, is clearly inconsistent with the State's assertion at trial
that this particular defendant was alone responsible for the rape or murder
of the victim. 30 3 It is also inconsistent for a prosecutor to suggest that a
victim was promiscuous to explain the exculpatory results of postconviction DNA testing after asserting at trial that the victim had not had
sex with anyone else before the attack, as the State did in Roy Criner's
case. 30 4 A stronger incidence of inconsistency occurs when a prosecutor
denigrates the probative value of post-conviction DNA test results after
having used now-rudimentary conventional serology test results at trial to
link the defendant to the crime, as prosecutors did in the cases of Wilton
Dedge and Ralph Armstrong. 30 5 In all of these scenarios, the State's theory
from trial and the new theory introduced for the first time in post-conviction
proceedings cannot both be true; thus they are truly inconsistent.
By contrast, the fact that a defendant confessed or pled guilty is not truly
inconsistent with a post-conviction claim of actual innocence. 306 The
number of post-conviction DNA exonerations that revealed that the
individual had given a false confession demonstrates that a confession is not
always motivated by actual culpability. 30 7 Similarly, criminal defendants
plead guilty for a multitude of strategic reasons, many of which have
30 8
nothing to do with being guilty of the crime for which they are charged.
Therefore, defendants who find themselves in such a predicament that they
see confessing or pleading guilty to be their only viable alternatives should
not later be estopped from pursuing post-conviction claims of innocence.
Furthermore, applying judicial estoppel in this way would seriously hinder
the system of plea bargaining. Considering that between eighty-eight and
ninety-five percent of criminal cases are resolved via plea bargaining, 30 9 the
application of judicial estoppel against these convicted offenders could have
a tremendous impact on the criminal justice system as a whole.
The prior success test is also met in these cases. Under the prior success
test, a prior assertion need only have been accepted by the court to be
considered successfully maintained. 3 10 Because it is difficult-or perhaps
impossible-to determine what facts presented at trial specifically
influenced a jury's decision in a criminal trial, judicial estoppel applies in

303. See supra notes 123-28, 226-29 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.

305. See supra notes 58, 199-201 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 277-83 and accompanying text.
307. See supra note 42.

308. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
309. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal
Justice Statistics: Disposition of Cases Terminated in U.S. District Courts 418 tbl.5.17
(2001), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t517.pdf; Bureau of Justice
Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics:
Felony
Convictions
in
State
Courts
450
tbl.5.46
(2001),
available
at
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t546.pdf.
310. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
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criminal cases if the trial record reflects 3that
the evidence being
1
contradicted was significant to the guilty verdict. '
In all of the cases detailed above, the State used conventional serology
evidence at trial to link the defendant to the crime. 3 12 Moreover, the trial
records from these cases indicate that this forensic evidence was often the
linchpin of the State's case against the defendant. 3 13 Indeed, the DNA
exonerations where the original conviction rested largely on the basis of
conventional serology test results indicate that juries presented with such
evidence did, in fact, view it as highly indicative of guilt. 3 14 Furthermore,
the Supreme Court has recognized that expert testimony regarding serology
evidence that linked a defendant to a crime constituted "a vital part in the
case for the prosecution" and "an important link in the chain of
3 15
circumstantial evidence" implicating the defendant as the perpetrator.
There can be no doubt that a review of the trial records in these cases
would show that the forensic evidence, the importance of which the State is
contradicting in post-conviction proceedings, was a significant factor in
obtaining a conviction against the defendant. Therefore, the State's prior
position, inconsistent with what is being argued in the face of exculpatory
post-conviction DNA test results, was successfully maintained at trial.
Given that the other requirements are satisfied for the application of judicial
estoppel in these cases, 3 16 "the prosecution should be able to avoid the
impact of the doctrine only by demonstrating that the inconsistent theory
'317
was specifically rejected by the court or the jury [at] trial.
2. The Application of Judicial Estoppel in These Cases Advances the
Stated Policy Goals of the Doctrine
Furthermore, the application of judicial estoppel against the State in cases
where the State reverses course from trial and presents a radically new
theory of the crime in a subsequent proceeding advances the stated policy

311. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 3-4, 58, 114, 119, 199 and accompanying text; see also supra note
43.
313. See, e.g., Petition for Review, supra note 65, at 6. At Ralph Armstrong's trial, an

expert witness testified that hairs "very carefully" removed from the victim's body were
"consistent with" and "similar to" the defendant's reference samples. Id. Furthermore,
during the State's closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor showed the victim's bloody

robe belt to the jury and stated "[t]wo of the defendant's hairs were on this robe" and that
there was "no explanation" for those hairs being there "except that the defendant murdered"
the victim. Id.; see also Sellers, supra note 59 (recounting how the prosecutor argued at
Dedge's trial that the man who committed the rape "would have pubic hair identical to
Wilton Dedge-Dedge's pubic hair"); cf Watkins v. Miller, 92 F. Supp. 2d 824, 838-39

(S.D. Ind. 2000) (observing that the State's case would have been severely compromised had
the jury not accepted the State's "bacterial contamination" theory).
314.
315.
316.
317.

See supra note 43.
Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 4 (1967).
See supra notes 300-05 and accompanying text.
Poulin, supra note 25, at 1455.
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goals of the doctrine. 3 18 Judicial estoppel is warranted in these cases
because the prosecution is deliberately changing their position according to
the exigencies of the moment, behavior which undermines the integrity of
the justice system. 3 19 The integrity of the justice system is further
compromised when the State advances inconsistent theories of the crime in
separate proceedings because one theory is necessarily incorrect, and thus
one of the courts was misled. 320 Prosecutors are considered "minister[s] of
justice," 32 1 whose "obligation is... to see that, so far as possible, truth
emerges." 322 The impression that a prosecutor has misled a court, and that
this deception resulted in the conviction or continued incarceration of an
innocent person, no doubt erodes "public confidence in the purity" of the
judicial system, 323 a scenario which cries out for the application of judicial
estoppel.
CONCLUSION

DNA testing at the outset of prosecution is now routine; thus it is likely
that the number of wrongful convictions that can be exposed through postconviction DNA testing will decrease and ultimately disappear. 324 This
does not mean, however, that the problems that lead to wrongful
convictions have been cured. 325 While DNA evidence can and will prevent
the wrongful conviction of some wrongly identified suspects, it cannot and
will not prevent the errors that occur in the vast majority of cases, where the
32 6
perpetrator has left behind no biological evidence that can be tested.
Thus, it is only in those few cases that have dispositive biological evidence
327
that post-conviction DNA testing prevents miscarriages of justice.
It is impossible to know how many innocent people are currently
imprisoned in this country, yet the 163 DNA-based exonerations suggest
the number is not insignificant; 3 28 indeed, the DNA-based exonerations
likely comprise only the tip of the iceberg. 329 However, non-DNA post-

318.
319.
320.
321.

See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
See Poulin, supra note 25, at 1463.
See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2001).

322. Peter Neufeld, Have You No Sense of Decency?, 84 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 189,

202 (1993) (citing Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 98 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring)); see
also United States v. Duke, 50 F.3d 571, 578 n.4 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that the prosecutor
has the "duty to serve and facilitate the truth-finding function of the courts"); United States
v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1323 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that "lawyers representing the
government in criminal cases serve truth and justice first").
323. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
324. Findley, supra note 40, at 337.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Medwed, supra note 52, at 131.
329. Id.; see also Protecting the Innocent, supra note 29, at 221 ("The vast majority
(probably 80%) of felony cases do not involve biological evidence that can be subjected to
DNA testing."); Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost
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conviction cases are much harder for convicted offenders to win because of
the absence of a method to prove innocence to a scientific certainty, 330 yet
these cases presumably contain the same proportion of flaws-including
erroneous eyewitness identifications, false confessions, and inclusive results
of now-rudimentary conventional serology analysis-that led to the
wrongful convictions in the cases later reversed through DNA test
33
results. 1
It has been said that "[w]rongful convictions will continue to occur as
long as our criminal justice system utilizes human actors. Exonerations due
to DNA testing only serve to underscore the risk of mistake in every
case." 332 The reaction of prosecutors to post-conviction innocence claims
has had and will continue to have a great bearing on whether actually
innocent prisoners receive justice, 333 and, therefore, on the perception of the
criminal justice system as a whole. Thus, the larger question posed by the
number of DNA-based exonerations is whether the exposed flaws in the
system will cause prosecutors to listen sympathetically to and avoid making
inconsistent arguments against claims of actual innocence based on less
334
categorical forms of evidence.
Justice demands that every reasonable measure be taken to ensure that no
innocent person suffer a wrongful conviction. 335 Moreover, public safety
demands accuracy in convictions, because when an innocent person is
convicted, the true perpetrator goes unpunished, free to commit additional
336
crimes that may have been prevented.

Confessions-Andfrom Miranda,88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 497, 518 (1998) (estimating
that "approximately 330 wrongful convictions occur around the country each year"); Richard
A. Rosen, Innocence and Death, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 61, 69-70, 73 (2003) (observing that DNA
exonerations comprise "a random audit of convictions," and that "DNA testing has
demonstrated beyond question that in the normal course of events, using the normal run of
evidence, we convict innocent people," thus, "for every defendant who is exonerated
because of DNA evidence, there have been certainly hundreds, maybe thousands, who have
been convicted" on comparable evidence yet whose cases lack physical evidence suitable for
scientific testing).
330. Medwed, supra note 52, at 131-32.
331. Id.at 131; see also Death Penalty Information Center, Innocence and the Crisis in
Penalty,
Death
American
the
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=45&did=l 149#Sec05b (last visited Sept.

28, 2005).
332. See Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 331.
333. Medwed, supra note 52, at 132.
334. See Liptak, supra note 111.
335. Findley, supra note 40, at 337-38.
336. Id. For example, Christopher Ochoa and Richard Danziger were wrongfully
convicted of the rape and murder of their coworker. As a result, the real perpetrator, Achim
Marino, remained free in the community, where he committed numerous rapes and robberies
for which he was eventually sentenced to life in prison. Id.at 338 n.23.

